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Abstract 
 
Background 
Public actors and, in general, public service providers - such as municipalities, provinces 
and agencies - play a major role in achieving a satisfying quality of life for citizens.  
The social context in which these institutions operate is intrinsically complex. This 
complexity arises from the different expectations of the community  (pluralism). It also arises 
from the plurality of actors involved in policy-making (institutional complexity) and from the 
interplays of several factors, such as those related to technical, economic and environmental 
dimensions (scientific uncertainty) (Head & Alford, 2013). 
The above characteristics determine what literature defines as ‘wicked’ problems (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973). The term ‘wicked’ does not means ‘evil’, but refers to issues that are hard to 
define and manage, due to the high complexity of the environment which they affect 
(Australian Public Service Commission, 2007; Head & Alford, 2013). These issues often lead 
to counterintuitive behaviours in terms of time (trade-off between short- and long-term) and 
space (trade-off between different institutions or functional areas within an organization) 
when actions are taken to resolve them. Institutional complexity, pluralism and scientific 
uncertainty typically characterize the provision of public services, for this reason, many issues 
that Public Administrations (PA) have to deal with, can be considered wicked. 
Over the last thirty years, New Public Management (NPM) reforms (Hood, 1991) have 
drastically changed the role and the way Public Sector institutions are managed. NPM 
reforms, in particular, were aimed at addressing the shortcomings of the traditional paradigm 
of Public Administration based on Weber’s model of ideal bureaucracy (Hood, 1991; 
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O’Flynn, 2007). Performance and market orientation, and decentralization of power to local 
authorities are two of the main pillars which support the NPM reform (Hood, 1991). 
However, the resulting structural devolution and quasi-privatization created multi-level 
governance structures in which public services are subjected to pressures and constraints 
arising from different institutional levels, with diverse goals and service expectations. These 
pressures and constraints, which often push toward conflicting goals between the institutions 
involved, are mainly due to ownership relationships, asymmetric exchange of resources 
(Lioukas et al., 1997) and contracts (Head & Alford, 2013). The result is a fragmentation of 
both the governance structure and the stakeholders aims that service providers must comply 
with when pursuing a desired performance in terms of outcomes (e.g. quality of life) for the 
community they are supplying. 
Christensen and Laegreid (2007) maintain that the emerging multi-level governance 
structure is hampering the capability of both the political and administrative bodies to 
effectively intervening on the levers of control related to the public service provision. 
Fragmentation enhances the institutional complexity in the  public sector and, therefore, the 
presence of wicked problems in the decision-making sphere (Steane et al., 2015).  
At an urban level, among the services that the public sector is called upon to provide, 
transportation plays a central role (Meyer & Miller, 2000; Hall, 2000; Miller & Hoel, 2002; 
Caragliu et al., 2011; Lombardi et al., 2012; Albino et al., 2015). The significance of people’s 
mobility in cities is related to direct, indirect and induced effects on the economy, as well as 
on the development of the urban area (World Bank, 2002; Weisbrod, 2009). The direct effects 
concern both time and cost of travelling for citizens and capital purchases for transportation 
sectors. Indirect and induced effects are mainly related to sales, productivity and support for 
jobs in the transportation sector as well as on other sectors (Weisbrod, 2009). 
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Interdependencies among transportation, land use, community development, and 
environmental systems together with a diverse set of stakeholders interests and interagency 
relationships (Weiner, 1999) makes transportation problems become increasingly wicked 
(Willson et al., 2003). 
 
Research objective and questions 
This research aims at contributing to the research stream focused on the structuring and 
managing of urban transportation systems in a wicked environment whose complexity is 
generated by institutional fragmentation.  
Given the diverse goals and expectations accruing from the multi-level governance 
structure depicted above, the research will address the following questions:  
 
RQ 1: how do different governance levels influence public transportation performance in 
complex institutional settings? Particularly, can we identify and monitor barriers and 
determinants of good performance in transportation systems where a great number of actors is 
involved?  
 
In recent years, coordination and inter-institutional joint-action have been identified by 
literature as possible approaches for dealing with governance fragmentation and the wicked 
problems arising from it (Pollit, 2003; Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Benington & Moore, 
2011; Head & Alford, 2013). These solutions created network structures where traditional 
Performance Management (PM) systems results excessively static in terms of time and space 
and, therefore, do not help in understanding the process of accumulation and depletion of 
resources and the effect of their employment on outcomes. 
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RQ 2: How to adapt a performance management perspective aimed at supporting 
institutional systems to achieve a better coordination among those players involved in 
decision-making processes? How to frame the governance of urban transportation systems in 
such a way that it allows us to build a shared understanding of problems and to align distinct 
organizations in the pursuit of common objectives? Is a strategic dialogue achievable through 
the application of new feedback relationships between the different governance levels?  
 
Methodology 
The adoption of a systemic and dynamic approach for the analysis of the wicked problems 
of social contexts like urban transportation systems, is suggested by literature (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973; Hjorth & Bagheri, 2006; Head & Alford, 2013).  
System Dynamics/Thinking is an approach that enables us to frame complex systems 
(Sterman, 2000) and to adopt a systemic view when trying to tackle wicked problems (Hjorth 
& Bagheri, 2006; Head & Alford, 2013; Auping et al., 2015; Bianchi, 2015). In order to 
explore urban transportation service performance, System Dynamics will be used through a 
Performance Management perspective (Bianchi, 2010). 
The present work will also be supported by the analysis of two different case studies. Since 
each transportation system has distinctive characteristics - derived from different legal and 
managerial systems, geography and population development - two case studies of two urban 
areas (Palermo in Italy and Buenos Aires in Argentina) were developed. The aim of the case 
studies is to show the  potential benefits of a systemic and performance-oriented approach for 
tackling wicked issues arising from fragmented governance structures. Particularly, the case 
studies will start taking on the service providers perspective, shifting then the boundaries of 
the analysis in order to include the other governance levels influencing the service 
performance. 
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Results 
In multi-level governance structures, such as the ones discussed in the cases provided, the 
lack of communication and coordination often generates unilateral and asymmetric exchange 
of resources (Lioukas et al., 1993). Through the definition of a set of performance indicators 
outcome oriented, the policy-solutions hereby proposed will explore the possibility to build 
new feedback processes across the governance levels. These feedbacks will link the results 
achieved by the service provider with the system strategic resources when these are owned or 
controlled by other actors. The resulting models represent useful tools that service providers 
may adopt to enhance communication with other governance levels, or tools that top-
governance level may use so as to design resources allocation policies. 
In order to answer the research questions set out above this work has been structured as 
follows. An opening chapter will provide an introduction to the evolution of urban 
transportation systems, with a particular focus on the role that Public Administrations have 
been called upon to assume over recent decades; a second chapter will present the research 
methodology used in this study, at the same time highlighting the advantages for its adoption; 
the case studies will be discussed in the third and fourth chapters, so as to show how a 
systemic and performance-oriented approach can be used in different contexts and for 
different governance-related issues. A fifth chapter will then look at the two case studies 
previously analysed in a comparative perspective. The concluding chapter will sum up the 
contribution made by the present work, and outline the future challenges and perspectives this 
study could address. 
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Chapter 1: Background Studies 
 
1.1 The Rise of Multi-level Governance Structures in Public Sectors: a ‘Wicked’ 
Context 
 
1.1.1 Wicked Problems 
 
“Policy problems cannot be definitively described”. With this sentence Rittel and Webber 
(1973, pp. 155) introduced the concept of ‘wicked problems’ within the Public Administration 
field. The term ‘wicked’ does not means ‘evil’, but refers to issues hard to define and manage 
due to the high complexity of the environment which they affect (Australian Public Service 
Commission, 2007; Head & Alford, 2013). These issues are persistent and often lead to 
counterintuitive behaviours despite considerable effort to solve them (Van  Bueren  et al., 
2003).  
In order to better identify ‘wicked’ problems, Rittel and Webber (1973) outlined their 
characteristics:  
1. There is no definitive formulation: In complex contexts there are no criteria for 
framing problems since they exist in open systems. The process of formulating a 
wicked problem is the problem itself. This happens because the information we 
need to understand wicked problems depends on the way in which we intent to 
solve them and by our biases in dealing with it. 
2. They have no stopping rule: the problem of solving a wicked problem is equivalent 
with the process of understanding it. According to the first proposition, in open 
systems, such as the ones in which these issues exist, there are no ends to the causal 
chains that link the steps achieved in the process of understanding them.  
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3. Solutions are not true-or-false, but good or bad: the process of evaluation of the 
solutions provided to tackle wicked problems is influenced by the interests, the 
value-set and the ideological predilections of who is judging. Social facts cannot be 
classified as true or false in absolute terms; therefore their assessment may be better 
expressed as “good or bad”, “better or worse”, “satisfying” or “good enough”. 
4. It is not possible to test a solution: if we implement a solution for a wicked 
problem, it will generates a wave of consequences that will not allow us to isolate 
the solution itself. For example, in complex systems short term solutions may 
appear to work, but just later on we can measure their real impact. Simulations may 
represent a useful tool to understand the expected impact of solutions for wicked 
problems. This can compress or expand time and space, allowing learners, for 
example, to simulate decades in the life of a business or a century of climate change 
in a few minutes (Sterman, 2014). When real experimentation is too slow, too 
costly, unethical or just plain impossible, that is, for most of the social issues we 
face nowadays, simulation becomes the main tool we can use in order to discover 
how complex systems work and where high leverage points may lie (Sterman, 
2014). 
5. There is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error: when dealing with wicked 
problems, every implemented solution is consequential and irreversible. If we build 
a new road for solving a congestion problem spending a relevant amount of money, 
we cannot easily disinvest if its performance is not satisfactory, and its effects will 
impact for several years on the life of the people involved. Therefore, in context in 
which actions taken are irreversible and the half-lives of the consequences are long, 
every trial counts. 
13 
 
6. They do not have an enumerable set of potential solutions: generally, in the pursuit 
of a wicked problem, a host of potential solution arises, and another host is never 
though up. When problems are ill-defined, the set of potential solutions relies on 
realistic judgement and on the amount of credibility and feasibility of the actions 
proposed. 
7. Every problem is essentially unique: there are no classes of wicked problems. 
Although some wicked problems may look similar, we can never be sure that the 
particularities of a problem do not override its commonalities with other problems 
already dealt with. 
8. Every problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem: problems 
consist in the gap between ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’. In order to solve 
problems we should first understand the cause of the discrepancy. Removing the 
cause identified poses another problem of which the original plan was the 
symptom. The new problem can, in turn, be considered the symptom of still another 
‘higher level’ problem, and so on. This is what happen in wicked contexts. Trying 
to cure symptoms may complicates the resolution of the root problem because 
‘every trial counts’ (see proposition 5). An example could be given by fragmented 
governances when symptoms are experienced by single players that tackle them at 
their own level without exploring the real problem behind those symptoms. 
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in 
numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s 
resolution: in dealing with wicked issues we cannot rely on linear mode of 
reasoning and to put an hypothesis to a crucial test because of their uniqueness (see 
proposition 7) and lacking of opportunity for rigorous experimentation (see 
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proposition 5). People tend to choose explanation arbitrarily – the ones that are 
plausible and fit their intentions best. 
10. Decision makers have no right to be wrong: in the sense that there is no tolerance of 
experiments that fail. Decision-makers are made responsible for the consequences 
of the actions they generates. Moreover, their solutions proposed are confounded 
by a further set of dilemmas raised by the growing pluralism of the publics. 
 
Because of the characteristics outlined above we can counterpose wicked problems to 
‘tame’ ones. These lasts can be easily defined and formulated because they are characterized 
by low level of complexity and  are capable of standard or routine solutions (Head & Alford, 
2013). Of course, tame and wicked problems are just the extremes of a wide spectrum of 
problem types. Therefore we can argue that there are several degrees of ‘wickedness’. These 
change on the base of multiple dimensions (Head & Alford, 2013). Among these dimensions 
Head and Alford (2013) identifies:  
- Scientific uncertainty: fragmentation and gaps in reliable knowledge about 
problems,  
- Institutional complexity: governance fragmentation and interconnectedness,  
- Social pluralism: diverging interests and values of stakeholders.  
Such features generally characterize policy problems. Even planners that operates in 
private contexts, such as corporations, need to recognizes certain level of wickedness in their 
planning activity. However, the context in which wicked emerges with more strength is the 
public one. Uncertainty, institutional fragmentation and pluralism of interests are common – 
and cannot be ignored - to many Public Administrations and other public service providers, 
such as agencies and utilities. 
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While uncertainty and social pluralism are intrinsic in the public domain, institutional 
complexity arose due to the several reforms that characterized PAs over the last thirty years.  
Particularly, the interventions addressed at reforming Public Administrations in 1980s and 
1990s determined structural changes in managing and organizing public institutions. One of 
the results of these changes is a governance fragmentation (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; 
Pollit, 2003) that increases both complexity and pluralism in the environment in which Public 
Administrations operate and, as a result, the wickedness of the problems they are dealing 
with.  
Administrative fragmentation and external constrains often result in a lack of strategic 
dialogue between different governance levels, as well as in a competition in setting policy 
priorities between political and administrative bodies (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007). 
Pressures and constraints coming from different institutional levels carrying a multiplicity of 
goals and expectations - though under the same institutional mission - might indeed 
complicate effective policy-makers’ interventions.  
These reasons have been often used to blame multi-level governance as an institutional 
setting contributing  to  inefficiency,  opaqueness  and  institutional inertia.  However,   
multiple  levels also provide access for new actors  to  decision-making,  and  may  possibly  
contribute to  checks  and  balances  for  policy-making  and  implementation,  and  to  the  
mobilization  of stakeholders  and their resources  and  commitment (Van  Bueren  et al., 
2003). This may happen only if there is an adequate interaction an coordination among the 
player involved in the decision-making processes. 
Wicked problems  are indeed  issues that require  interaction  and  negotiation  between  
actors involved  in  order  to  come  to  a mutual understanding  of the nature  of  the  problem  
and  how  this may  be tackled  (Van  Bueren  et al., 2003; Ferlie et al., 2011).  Strategies  for  
addressing  wicked  problems should  take  the  institutional constellation  of  interdependent 
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relationships  and  resource  dependencies  between stakeholders  as  given,  and  build  a 
mutual understanding of  problems  that  can  guide  joint  effort to cope  with  wickedness 
(Ferlie et al., 2011).  
In the last twenty years, both theory (Kettl, 2006; Mandell & Keast, 2007; Weber & 
Khademian, 2008; Ferlie et al., 2011; Head & Alford, 2013) and practice (Joint-up and 
Whole-of Government reforms) concerned with wicked problems and multi-level governance 
have been focused on the need to improve coordination of actions and collaboration between 
internal and external stakeholders. An inter-institutional governance approach, including new 
forms of coordination and power-distribution between the main actors involved, has been 
introduced in order to tackle the wickedness coming from governance fragmentation 
(Christensen & Laegreid, 2007) and to neutralize or limit its negative implications on both 
policy- and decision-making. 
In the following paragraph the public management reform processes that occurred in the 
last 40 years will be explored and discussed with the aim of understanding the determinants of 
governance fragmentation in relation to wicked problems. 
 
1.1.2 Public Management Reforms 
 
Public Administration (PA) practices have always attempted to respond to the challenges 
and the shortcoming of what came before (Bryson et al., 2014). 
Until the 1980s PA were adopting hierarchical forms of organization and control so as to 
respond to a particular set of conditions – industrialization, urbanization, the rise of the 
modern corporation, faith in science, belief in progress and concern over major market 
failures (Bryson et al., 2014). These forms were aligned with the typical bureaucratic 
administration model conceptualized by Weber in the firsts decades of 1900s. 
17 
 
In order to avoid a political or individual influence across the administrations, bureaucracy 
models are mainly concerned on input monitoring and process compliance rather than results 
achievement. This have the effect of limiting the administration ability to develop a decision-
making process policy-oriented. Another feature of the traditional approach is represented by 
the tendency to foster specialization that tends make each single department a cultural 
fortress, creating ‘vertical silos’ (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Head & Alford, 2013). 
New Public Management (NPM) was the major public sector reform approaches that many 
western nations adopted during the period between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s (den 
Heyer, 2011) so as to respond to a concern with government failures and a belief in the 
efficiency of markets (Bryson et al., 2014). This reform was indeed aimed at solving the 
shortcomings with regard to efficiency and effectiveness, which are intrinsic in the traditional 
bureaucratic approach described above (Hood, 1991).  
Hood (1991) identifies seven main doctrinal components around which NPM was built:  
- Hands-on professional management: giving more ‘freedom’ to top managers; 
- Explicit standards and measures of performance: goals orientation and definition of 
indicators; 
- Greater emphasis on output controls: resource allocation linked to measured 
performance; 
- Shift to disaggregation of units: creation of ‘manageable’ units inside the PA; 
- Shift to greater competition: move to term contracts; 
- Stress on private sector style of management: greater flexibility for hiring and 
rewards; 
- Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.  
These doctrines sat alongside four reinforcing megatrends (Hood, 1991; O’Flynn, 2007): 
slowing down or reversing government growth; privatisation and quasi-privatisation; 
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automation in the production and distribution of public services; an international agenda 
focused on public policy and management issues. Synthetically, we can conceive NPM 
reform as a push away from large, centralized government agencies toward devolution and 
privatization (Bryson et al., 2014).  
The practical application of NPM suffered from a range of weaknesses attributable to 
implementation issues and fundamental tensions (O’Flynn, 2007). Although NPM succeeded 
at superseding the bureaucratic model in various ways, competitive government models tend 
to create isolation and competition among programmes and departments inside the public 
sector which strengthen the ‘silos’ structure already in place (Cristensen & Laegreid, 2007) 
and may spur destructive behaviour (O’Flynn & Alford, 2005; O’Flynn, 2007). If we consider 
that these programmes and departments may have subterranean connections in respect to 
certain problems, their isolation enhances the overall wickedness.  
In NPM, public service organizations are dominated by producer interests. As a result, 
public service organizations tend to be neither efficient in terms of saving public money nor 
responsive to consumer needs (Stocker, 2006). In order to resolve such a distortion the 
solution adopted was to fragment monopolistic public service structures and to develop 
incentives and tools to influence the way that they operate. 
These consideration lead us to maintain that NPM was ill- suited to deal with wicked 
problems because it did foster public agencies fragmentation and isolation that was already in 
place with traditional public administration paradigm (Head & Alford, 2013). The main issues 
which characterize the ‘pillarization’ of the public sector which followed the NPM reform, 
can be summarized as (Pollit, 2003): contradiction and tension between different policies 
which decrease their effectiveness; duplication and contradiction of action programmes which 
negatively affect the use of resources; lack of synergy among stakeholders; fragmented 
services provided to citizens. 
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The pitfalls of NPM are also related to new material conditions and challenges that have 
emerged in recent years (Bryson et al., 2014). These are mainly related to an increase of the 
environmental complexity in which PAs operates.  
In such a new context, Moore (1995) identified the need to shift away from the competitive 
paradigm, focused on results and efficiency, toward the achievement of a broader goal, 
namely: ‘Public Value’ creation.  
Public Value is a multidimensional construct created by government through services, laws 
regulation and other actions (Kelly et al. 2002), therefore, it primarily results from 
government performance (Moore, 1995; Bryson et al., 2014).  
Public Value management may be considered as the emerging management paradigm for 
PA (Stocker, 2006; Bryson et al., 2014). This is based on the proposition that a wide range of 
stakeholders is legitimized and should be included and involved in the PA activity (Stocker, 
2006; O’Flynn 2007). 
Public Value creation is determined by the delivery of services – which represents the first 
vehicle for creating value -, the achievement of outcomes - that includes the wider and 
dynamic impact that results from the actions taken - and the generation of trust (O’Flynn, 
2005, 2007). The outcome focus that characterizes the emerging paradigm has been remarked 
by several theorist (Moore, 1995; Stocker, 2006; O’Flynn, 2007; Bryson et al. 2014). 
Outcomes achievement in the public context does not depend exclusively by the action of 
single organizations, but it requires more collaborative effort (Brousseine, 2003; Stoker, 
2006). In a highly fragmented PA, the need for collaboration is even stronger. Fragmented 
governance structure has been found disruptive (O’Flynn & Alford, 2005; O’Flynn, 2007; 
Steane et al., 2015) because fragmentation increases  institutional complexity and, therefore, 
the presence of wicked problems (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Head & Alford, 2013; 
Steane et al., 2015). The presence of collaborative relationships represents the linchpin for 
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understanding and addressing wicked problems where multiple parties - with differential 
knowledge, interests or values - are involved (Head & Alford, 2013). This is due to three main 
elements that collaboration determines (Head & Alford, 2013): a better understanding of the 
nature of the problems; the development of agreed solutions; an easier implementation of the 
solutions identified. 
Due to this, since 1997, many Countries – among which we find UK, Australia and New 
Zealand as first movers - have been attempting to increase their ability to deal with problems 
related to governance fragmentation through a new wave of reforms called ‘Joined-up 
Government’ (or ‘Whole of Government’), whose aim is the enhancement of coordination 
between different governance levels for improving public sector performance (Pollit, 2003; 
Christensen & Laegreid, 2007). Joined-Up Government (JUG) ‘is an umbrella term 
describing various ways of aligning formally distinct organizations in pursuit of the objectives 
of the government of the day’ (Ling, 2002, pp. 616). JUG aspires at achieving horizontal and 
vertical coordination so as to eliminate situations in which different policies undermine each 
other, to make a better use of scarce resources, to improve synergies among stakeholders in a 
particular policy area and to offer citizens less fragmented access to services (Pollit, 2003; 
Christensen & Laegreid, 2007). 
The idea behind this wave of reform is to design and implement more flexible and 
pervasive governmental systems in order to foster a more pragmatic and intelligent 
collaboration among different players (Bianchi, 2015). To do that, JUG trend proposes an 
inter-institutional governance approach, including new forms of coordination and power-
distribution between the main actors involved, so as to tackle the ‘wickedness’ coming from 
governance’s fragmentation (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Karré et al. 2013; Steane et al., 
2015), and to neutralize or reduce its negative consequences on system service performance 
(Pollit, 2003). 
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JUG operates at two different levels for creating coordination (Carey et al., 2015): the first 
is the institutional one - acting on ‘institutional’ factors, such as relationships, the 
interdependencies between different actors, and the rules that guide action; the second point 
of intervention is at the level of structure and process - interventions at this level seek to alter 
the structure of the network, thereby influencing the nature and processes of interaction 
between actors.  
The present work, and the case studies that will be further explored, focus on coordination 
at an institutional level. That means, coordination solutions and policies designed in the cases 
will consider governance structures as given and will aim at improving the system by acting 
on rules and relationships between the players. 
 
1.1.3 About Performance Management application in the Public Sector 
 
Performance Management (PM) is here broadly defined as the process by which an 
organization manages its performance in line with its institutional mission, strategy and 
desired purposes (Bititci et al., 1997; Neely, 1999; Otley, 1999). The general purpose of PM 
systems is to describe the link of resources with activities and outputs, and to link outputs to 
outcome (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2006). 
NPM can be acknowledged as the reform that introduced the use of Performance 
Management tools in the public sector (Bouckaert & Van Dooren, 2003; Modell, 2009; 
Marcon & Russo, 2014). 
The main reasons that justified the introduction of PM in the public sector can be 
synthetized in (Marcon & Russo, 2014): 
- a need to introduce strict forms of managerial and financial control; 
- the emulation of private sector’s practices; 
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- a greater focus transparency in Public Administration; 
- the need to enhance the effectiveness; 
- the implementation of result-based evaluations; 
- the will to enhance a veritable professional accountability. 
The advantages of Performance Management applied to the public sector are of obvious 
systemic importance in considering the accountability requirement of linking the activities 
performed by public managers to the performance achieved (Marcon & Russo, 2014). 
Even though a new management paradigm is emerging in the public organizations sector, 
the adoption of PM frameworks may still be considered necessary. However, it emerges the 
need to improve them in relation to both the new structures which characterize PAs and the 
new expectation of the community – in a broad sense - with regards to public services. The 
implementation of post-NPM reforms indeed implies the use of an outcome oriented view of 
performance to frame and assess new objectives of public organizations (Bianchi, 2015). A 
new PM approach should also consider the effects of actions and programmes both in the 
short and in the long run. Moreover, the viewpoint of PM systems should be wider in spatial 
term, not only focusing on single units or institutions, but on an inter-institutional perspective 
(Bianchi, 2012, 2015). 
 Bianchi (2010, 2012) identifies three complementary views of PM: objective, instrumental 
and subjective one. The objective view takes into account the relationship between an 
organization and its environment. Once the ‘product-client’ of a system/organization has been 
identified, it is possible to design the processes and the activities needed to generate it. Surely, 
the products generated by these processes may be addressed to internal (e.g. back office units) 
or external clients. Specially in the public sector, understanding the impact of internal clients 
is a necessary step so as to improve the overall performance and to foster accountability 
within the organization/network. 
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According to an instrumental view of performance, PM frameworks are usually 
characterized by three main elements:  
- Strategic resources: physical or information resources held by the system that can 
be employed in order to achieve some desired result. 
- Performance indicators: intermediate results that measures the state of a system by 
comparing it with a target value or a benchmark. 
- End-results: the results the Administration gets thanks to the management cycle 
(production process).  
In fragmented governance structured it may happen that strategic resources and end-results 
are under the control of different actors. This add an element of complexity when designing 
PM systems. 
The subjective view provide a synthesis of the previous two because it relates both the 
activities to undertake and the related objectives, and performance targets to achieve. This 
view focuses on the importance of strategic goals/objective settings. Distortions that may raise 
with improper goal settings (i.e. unfocused goals, confusions between means and ends, etc.) 
risk to affect the overall system performance. This is particularly true in PAs when different 
organizations pursue different and maybe conflicting goals. 
 
Figure 1.1: Three views for designing a performance management system (Bianchi, 2010) 
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When analysing performances, the perspectives through which an organization, or - in case 
of multi-level governance – a network, can be observed are three (Bianchi, 2012): internal, 
external and time. Under the internal profile, performance emerges from the consistency 
between different sub-systems, departments or areas of an organization – i.e. the coherence 
between strategic guide and operations. Under the external profile, organizational 
performance can be articulated in different dimensions (Eccles, 1991; Coda, 2010; Litman, 
2014). Particularly Coda (2010) identifies financial, competitive and social ones. An 
unbalance between these dimensions – i.e. prevalence of financial performance in respect to 
the competitive or social one - may determine an unsustainable growth rate. Lastly, time 
perspective concerns the prejudice that short-term policies may cause in the long-term results.  
 
Figura 1.2: Framing organizational performance (Bianchi , 2012) 
Traditionally, PM frameworks to PA has been mainly focused on the financial dimension 
of performance. These tools have been mainly used on an annual base in order to justify the 
use of resources (den Heyer, 2011) creating inefficiencies and unbalances between different 
institutions. 
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Some authors (Sloper et al., 1999; Linard & Dvorsky, 2001; Bisbe and Malagueño, 2012; 
Bianchi, 2012) have also raised others critical issues related to the development and use of 
traditional PM approaches. Bisbe and Malagueño (2012) put in evidence the lack of a 
perspective that may capture the dynamic complexity of managerial decision-making. PM 
techniques tend to ignore a number of relevant factors influencing both planning and 
measuring organizational performance and, therefore, they may limit decision-makers’ 
strategic learning processes (Sloper et al., 1999; Linard & Dvorsky, 2001). Such factors are 
primarily associated to delays, non-linearity, intangibles, and to the unintended consequences 
on human perceptions and behaviours caused by a superficial or mechanistic approach in 
setting performance targets. Bianchi et al. (2015) found that traditional Performance 
Management approaches result to be static in terms of space - they tend to stress excessively 
some functional areas of organizations while ignoring others - and time - they do not allow 
one to properly assess both determinants and consequences of performance with reference to 
the trade-offs existing between short and long-term effects. Due to that, these tools do not 
help in understanding the process of accumulation and depletion of strategic resources and the 
performance drivers’ effect on outcome indicators (Morecroft, 1999; Warren, 2005).  
These pitfalls lead to behavioural distortions, or ‘performance paradoxes’, such as 
‘myopia’ - when managers focus their efforts on short term targets at the expense of longer 
term objectives -, measure fixation - when outcomes are difficult to measure there is a natural 
tendency to use performance indicators based on measurable outputs -, unclearness about 
what is actually measured, ‘symbolic behaviour’ - monitoring appears to be in place but is in 
fact not -, etc. (Marcon & Russo, 2014). However, this does not mean that PM approaches are 
harmful for PAs. These distortion may be overcome through the adoption of a dynamic and 
systemic perspective (Bianchi et al., 2010; Bianchi, 2012; Bianchi et al., 2015; Noto & 
Bianchi, 2015).  
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A systemic perspective may allow PM experts to switch from output performance 
measures to outcome ones, making Performance Management an approach useful to drive 
decision-makers in both designing competitive strategies and measuring the results achieved. 
A fragmented governance, in which several stakeholders are involved in a service 
provision process, enhances the issues related to static nature of PM approaches. In an 
environment characterized by different expectations, setting strategic goal as well as 
allocating resources may be particularly challenging unless an understanding of what is 
needed to be achieved by the stakeholders is shared.  
The network mechanism arose for dealing with wickedness in the public sector strengthen 
the need for revising traditional PM systems (Putansu, 2015). PM should adopt a perspective 
able to consider the network of actors and their collaborative practices when measuring and 
monitoring performance. A more sophisticated approach to PM should focus on the end-
results of the network logic, because this would allow more flexibility in relation to the 
processes by which outcomes are achieved (Head and Alford, 2013). It should also recognize 
the complex feedback loops permeating actions and policy programs and the delays implicit 
when dealing with wicked issues, through greater focus on intermediate results evaluation 
(Head and Alford, 2013). 
 
1.2 The evolution of urban transportation systems: from public provisions to new 
organizational forms 
 
Urban areas economic and social health depends to a large extent on the performance of its 
transportation system (Meyer & Miller, 2000). Mobility in metropolitan areas is considered to 
be a public issue because of the huge impact of the externalities it produces. However, these 
externalities are not directly visible for each passenger when choosing between private or 
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public mode of transportation. Due to that public actors have to intervene in order to make 
public transportation more attractive, reducing the negative impact of  an excessive use of 
private transportation which is very unlikely to coincide with any acceptable concept of the 
public good (Della Porta & Gitto, 2013). Due to that, public transportation can be considered 
as a factor that contribute to the creation of Public Value. Particularly, transportation has a 
direct influence on quality of life, social integration and cohesion, productivity and 
competitiveness of firms operating in a territory (Barbero et al., 2011). However, since urban 
transportation systems are complex (Wang et al. 2008) and present an high degree of 
wickedness, the risk of running into counterintuitive behaviours when actions are taken to 
improve them is high. The wickedness of urban mobility issues depends by the three factors 
mentioned in the first paragraph. Particularly: 
- Pluralism concerns the different needs and expectations of the community in 
relation to transportation systems in terms of infrastructures and service supplied. 
For example, different targets of people may own different needs in relation to 
mobility, such as different businesses perceive infrastructures adequacy in different 
ways. 
- Institutional fragmentation characterizes service provision when more than one 
player is involved in it. This could be the case of an urban area in which the bus 
service is run by several private companies that run the service under the standard 
requirements of different public authorities.  In such a context it is hard to monitor 
performance and to check whether public or private investments provide the 
expected return in terms of ‘value’ for the reference community.  
- Scientific uncertainty permeate transportation systems in many aspects among 
which we may identify environmental impacts, users’ behaviour, etc. 
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The local public transport sector has not escaped the waves of reforms that characterized 
public management. We can identify two phases in the evolution of local public transportation 
which are coherent with the public management trend already explored. 
A first phase – NPM oriented - was characterized by a common path of changes oriented 
toward a growing usage of some form of competition (van del Velde, 1999). This determined 
the emergence of new service organizational settlements more output-oriented and more 
independent from political control (Della Porta & Gitto, 2013). Market orientation and 
performance management have been replacing traditional mechanism of transportation 
regulation that were mainly focused on the social function of the service (Della Porta & Gitto, 
2013). Competition and privatization have been implemented so as to reduce cost and to 
pursue efficiency. NPM reforms established a result-oriented culture that revolutionized the 
service provision. However, these new regulations have been failing in allowing 
transportation systems to pursue outcome results such as traffic congestion problems or 
pollution (Goodwin, 1997; Della Porta & Gitto, 2013). Market mechanisms stress the system 
on cost saving and efficiency pursuing ignoring public value creation process. In fact, this 
measures were aimed at strengthening financial sustainability of providers with the ambition 
of sustaining, in the long term, other dimensions of performance such as economic and social 
ones. However, not achieving public outcomes resulted in the raise of long term problems 
affecting the financial sustainability itself. This is due to the fact that urban transportation 
systems are complex, with multiple variables and feedback loops between subsystems and 
influencing factors (Wang et al. 2008).  
Van de Velde (1999) framed public transportation arrangements emerged in this period 
into two main categories: authority initiative and market initiative. This distinction refers to 
the organization of the supply of public transportation services and relates to the legal 
framework in which these services are provided. In authority initiated regimes, transport 
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authorities have the legal monopoly of service; this means that autonomous market entry is 
legally impossible. In market initiated regimes, the supply of transport services is based upon 
the principle of autonomous market entry resulting from a market process that may considers 
a certain regulation at the entrance. In figure 1.3 it is shown a diagram that allows us to 
analyse the different governance structures of urban transportation. 
 
Figure 1.3: Organisational forms in public transport (van de Velde, 1999) 
  In authority initiatives, service results from the decisions of the authority/ies. In these 
systems the service can be provided by ‘concessioning’ to private company or from public 
ownership arrangements. In concessioning, the authority selects a private company that is 
responsible for setting-up and operating the public transport service. Public ownership 
regimes may be based on one authority that owns vehicles and infrastructure, and runs 
directly the service - by itself or through a public owned company. Alternatively, the authority 
can make the assets available to a private operator which is in charge of managing the whole 
service (van de Velde, 1999). In such initiatives, the authority plays the role of the 
entrepreneur, however it leaves a limited room for initiative to the service provider selected.  
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In market initiatives services are meant to appear out of autonomous market processes. We 
may find ‘open entry regimes’ that rely on the hypothesis of perfect competition, contestable 
markets of monopolistic competition. In these cases the authority is not absent, but it will take 
action in order to guarantee the safety and continuity of the service. Other forms of organizing 
market initiatives are the ‘authorisation regimes’. In this case, in order to entry in the market 
and provide the transportation service, companies have to apply for an authorisation. On the 
one hand these regimes shift the burden of continuously service improvement to the market; 
on the other hand regulations and protection against competition may create a situation in 
which firms are no longer disciplined by market force.  
In market initiatives the authority do not play anymore the role of the entrepreneur but it 
may play three different roles (van de Velde, 1999):  
- Watchdog (regulatory authority): controlling on predatory behaviours by 
autonomous companies, safety of operations, coordination of supply, etc.;  
- Subsidiser: granting fare rebates to specific target groups of users and/or subsidise 
transport companies. The aim of these subsidies is the redistribution of wealth so as 
to reach a different market equilibrium than what would prevail otherwise. 
However, as we will see further on analyzing the Argentinian case, the use of 
subsidies may generate serious distortions and inefficiencies. 
- Supplier: in this case the authority goes back to its role of entrepreneur by 
complementing the system service with additional services that are deemed to be 
socially desirable (i.e. providing routes that are not profitable but that may help in 
overcome the segregation of some districts).  
Of course this classification in authority and market initiatives do not exclude the 
possibility to have combinations between them. In both kind of arrangements (authority or 
market) we find a delicate trade-off between pressures on financial outputs objectives of 
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service providers and the general interest related to the socio-environmental outcomes 
improvement. In fact, even when the service is run by public-owned enterprises, these have to 
take care of their economic and financial conditions together with pursuing the public interest 
(Cavalieri, 2010; Della Porta & Gitto, 2013). 
The different governance structures outcoming from the NPM reforms and  portrayed in 
figure 1.3, shares a common characteristic that is the presence of multiple decision levels.  
This, and the relative conflicting interests between stakeholders, enhances the complexity 
intrinsic in improving public local transportation (Della Porta & Gitto, 2013). Due to this 
complexity, the transformation of urban transportation services from an input to a result-
oriented perspective cannot be solved by only focusing on the companies providing the 
service (Stanley & Smith, 2013), but it should consider the whole system through an inter-
institutional perspective.  
These emerging criticalities gave room for a second phase of transformation that concerns 
a shift from output to outcome (Della Porta & Gitto, 2013) and a value creation orientation. 
Although many governments are going toward this direction, it is not possible yet to 
identify an unambiguous reform process with clear features and steps to follow. This is also 
due to the differences in the stage of NPM implementation across western countries and the 
different organizational forms adopted in public transport systems around the world. 
 However, many authors agree on the need for a better coordination and networking 
between the stakeholders involved in the service provision processes (Pucher, 1996; Hull, 
2005; Sager, 2004; Stanley & Smith, 2013; Della Porta & Gitto, 2013). The post-NPM 
reforms are indeed culturally oriented toward public governance. They focus on cultivating a 
strong sense of values, team-building, the involvement of participating organizations, trust, 
value-based management, collaboration, and improving the training and self-development of 
public servants (Ling, 2002; Christensen & Laegreid, 2013). 
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1.2.1 Performance Management and Measures of Urban Transportation 
 
Even though a new transformation of the local transportation sector is taking place 
worldwide, this does not mean that the tools introduced by NPM need to be indiscriminately 
discarded.   
Performance measurement and management systems are still essential to the achievement 
of strategic goals (Eboli & Mazzulla, 2012; Poister et al., 2013). In a study conducted on 88 
cases of transit agencies in the US, Poister et al. (2013) discovered that an extensive use of 
performance management practices contributes to increase effectiveness in small and 
medium-sized public transportation systems. This is proofed to be true because PM practices 
help both the establishment of clear goals and the generation of useful information that help 
decision-makers to manage programs more effectively (Poister et al., 2013). Therefore, when 
problems arise, the feedback provided by performance indicators and results can help both top 
and line managers in taking corrective actions on a timely basis, which is essential to keep on 
pursuing the desired goals (Poister et al., 2013). 
PM systems can be divided into hierarchically ordered types of activities, here called 
levels, which differ on the basis of scope and horizon (Van de Velde, 1999; Bianchi, 2004; 
Bouckaert & Halligan, 2006). PM levels were classified by Van de Velde (1999) using the 
following: 
- Strategic level (what do we want to achieve?): this first level is concerned with the 
formulation of those general goals that the organization aims at pursuing. The main 
features of the service – e.g. who the main target groups are, which one is the area 
of supply, how is the positioning of the service in relation to that of substitutes, etc. 
– are established at this level. 
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- Tactical level (what product can help us to achieve the aims?): this level focuses on 
a decision-making process directed at the acquisition of those means necessary for 
reaching the general aims fixed at the previous level, and on how to use these 
means most efficiently. The actual design of the service takes place at this level, 
e.g. definition of routes and frequency, fares, image of the service, etc. 
- Operational level (how do we produce that product?): at this level the necessary 
steps are taken so as to make sure that the service is delivered efficiently, by 
translating tactical aspects into day-to-day practice, e.g. management of vehicles, 
drivers, infrastructures, etc. 
It is clear that these levels are not necessarily harmonious and compatible (Bouckaert & 
Halligan, 2006). Well-functioning operational levels do not always guarantee a well-
functioning and good performing strategy/policy. PM systems should take this into account 
by looking at strategic, tactical and operational performance management (Bianchi, 2004; 
Bouckaert & Halligan, 2006). 
Therefore, in order to apply performance management to the whole transportation system 
of an urban area, these three levels should exchange information with each other. Thus, the 
operational level’s performance must be reported to the decision-makers working at the 
tactical level, so that they might intervene if necessary. Conversely, the performance achieved 
at the tactical level represents useful information for other levels, in order to adjust current 
strategies to the system. 
The figure below illustrates how this feedback system between strategic, tactical and 
operational (STO) levels works. 
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Figure 1.4: Strategic, tactical and operational levels’ feedback system 
The multi-level governance implicit in the urban transportation organizational forms 
described in the previous paragraph, often represents an obstacle for the interaction between 
different PM levels. In turn, this may impinge on the strategic level’s ability to establish 
general aims that will avoid being static and unclear. 
This study focuses particularly on proposing new solutions for improving performance at 
the tactical level. The proposed solutions will be well-suited to be integrated and support 
coordination with the other levels.  
Tactical level is responsible for the service’s design. Therefore service quality, which is the 
main outcome giving us of the goodness of the service and its design, is central to this study. 
Given the multi-faceted nature of the transportation service, previous literature has 
identified several performance indicators that may measure its quality (Eboli and Mazzulla, 
2012; Cascajo and Monzon, 2014). In particular, Eboli and Mazzulla (2012) provided a 
review of such indicators, by identifying some characteristics that would prove useful to 
decision-makers when evaluating service quality. These are: 
- Service availability: this variable is related to the path and coverage of the 
transportation system, the number of stops, their relative distance and location. It 
mainly concerns the service’s extensiveness and frequency. 
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- Service reliability: Turnquist and Blume (1980) define transit service reliability as 
“the ability of the transit system to adhere to schedule or maintain regular 
headways and a consistent travel time”. Therefore frequency and timeliness 
represent useful variables to be monitored (Cascajo and Monzon, 2014). 
- Fares: the service aspect regarding fares includes characteristics of the monetary 
cost of the journey, as well as the availability of volume discounts (e.g. for monthly 
passes). 
- Comfort and cleanliness: these aspects characterize the experience of users in 
adopting public transportation modes. 
- Safety and security: the two terms respectively indicate the chances of being 
involved in an accident, and of becoming  victim of a crime, while making use the 
service.    
- Information: passengers need to know how to use the transport service, where the 
access is located, where to get off in the proximity of their destination, whether any 
transfers are required, and when transit services are scheduled to depart and arrive. 
- Customer care: includes elements needed to make the journey easier and more 
pleasant, such as drivers’ courtesy, helpfulness of ticket agents, personnel’s 
appearance, and elements linked to the easiness of tickets’ purchase and of fares’ 
payment, like the presence and condition of ticket issuing and validation machines, 
and the effectiveness of ticket selling network.  
- Environmental impacts: this is the service aspect regarding the impact of mobility 
systems on the environment, including effects in terms of emissions, noise, visual 
pollution, vibration, dust and dirt, odour, waste, but also effects of vibrations on 
roads and estimations of natural resources’ consumption in terms of energy or 
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space. In this respect, vehicle’s age together with the type of vehicles (gasoline, 
methane, electric) give us a reference to monitor environmental impacts. 
Similar characteristics have also been identified by Cascajo and Monzon (2014). 
Particularly, they tested several performance indicators related to the areas identified above 
and found that most of them were successful in improving quality of service, customer 
satisfaction, and system productivity. 
The features listed above may weigh differently in determining result achievement, 
depending mainly on the qualities of the urban context where the service is run.  
Even though this study focuses particularly on the tactical level of performance, framing a 
PM system that takes into consideration all the three performance levels is essential in order 
to tackle wickedness and enhance coordination among stakeholders. In order to connect all 
three performance management levels – strategic, tactical and operational – is it necessary for 
these measures to provide for a feedback system reporting achieved results to the strategic 
resources owned by the system, even though through different actors. This is made possible 
only through the adoption of a dynamic perspective.  
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
 
 
A systemic (or ‘holistic’) view is recommended by the literature (Ackoff, 1974; Head & 
Alford, 2013; Rittel & Webber, 1973) in order to tackle wicked problems because it allows us 
to think broadly about social problems and their possible solutions, considering major 
stakeholders’ interests and expectations. The need to think systemically emerges from the 
complexity of the social environment. In complex situations, while focusing on single 
components or relationships within a system does not necessarily help to improve the whole 
system (Hjorth & Bagheri, 2006), it can also generate imbalances which, in the medium-long 
term, may negatively affect the performance of the same system component/relationship. 
A method which allows us to take a broader perspective on wicked issues is System 
Dynamics (SD). SD is indeed able to link a system’s structure to its performance and vice-
versa, often for the purpose of changing structure relationship so as to improve performance 
(Richmond, 1994; Hjorth & Bagheri, 2006).  
 
2.1 System Dynamics 
 
System Dynamics is an approach developed during the 1950’s primarily by J.W. Forrester. 
It  may be defined as a perspective and set of conceptual tools that enable us to understand the 
structure and dynamics of complex, non-linear, multi-loop feedback systems (Forrester, 1961; 
Meadows, 1980; Sterman, 2000). 
 Forrester brought together concepts from several sources such as control-engineering, 
cybernetic and organizational theory (Meadows, 1980; Vennix, 1990). This technique, which 
was originally applied to industrial company problems (e.g. inventory management, falling 
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market share, instability of labour force, etc.), has been successfully applied to a wide variety 
of social systems (Meadows, 1980). 
System Dynamics is suitable for analysing the dynamic tendencies of complex systems – 
i.e. what kind of behavioural patterns they generate over time. The main assumption of the SD 
paradigm is that these patterns arise from the causal structure of the system analysed. Causal 
structures are determined by physical or social constraints, goals, rewards and pressures that 
make a system’s agents behaving in a certain way (Meadows, 1980). 
SD methodology uses causal structures in order to frame the system under analysis. The 
perspective through which a system dynamicist looks at the system and its behaviour is 
endogenous. This means that modellers tend to shift the boundaries of their SD models in 
order to include the structures that cause a certain behaviour within the system. This 
perspective allows the modeller to build closed chains of causal relationship, also known as 
‘feedback loops’. System Dynamics models are made up of several feedback loops linked 
together. 
SD offers two kinds of representation: causal loop diagrams (CLD) and stock and flow 
diagrams (SFD). The first is qualitative and aims at focusing on the causal relationship among 
the variables. The other is quantitative and aims at emphasizing the physical structure of the 
system being analyzed. 
The figure below shows an example of feedback loop through a CLD representation. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A feedback loop 
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The structure represented in figure 2.1 explains how the population of a certain area has a 
positive
1
 influence on the amount of taxes the PA may collect. A greater amount of taxes 
generates resources that can be invested in the public services provided. Better public services 
make the area more attractive and this causes people living outside that area to move their 
businesses and residency into the area. The population will then grow due to this incoming 
migration flow. When every relationship in the loop is positive (therefore marked with the + 
sign) or the number of negative relationships is even, we have a so called ‘reinforcing’ loop. 
This kind of loop tends to produce exponential growth behaviours.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Exponenatial growth behaviour 
On the other hand, what are known as ‘balancing’ feedback loops, are characterized by an 
odd number of negative relationships, and tend to counteract any disturbance and move the 
system toward an equilibrium point (Meadows, 1980).  
 
                                                          
1
 Positive (or direct) here means that when one variable changes (e.g. increases) it determines a change in the same 
direction (e.g. increases) to the connected variable; negative (or indirect) means that when one variable changes (e.g. 
increases) it determines a change in the opposite direction (e.g. decreases) to the connected variable. 
40 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Balancing loop 
The inner loop in figure 2.3 is a balancing loop. As we may imagine, although an increase 
in population determines more potential taxes, in the long run it also means more people to 
serve and as a result public service inadequate to the needs of the new population. This loop 
tends to counteract the exponential growth behaviour shown previously. The following graph 
shows the typical ‘exponential decay’ behaviour of balancing loops. 
 
  
Figure 2.4: Exponential decay behaviour 
While the concept of a causal loop diagram is very immediate and easy to understand, the 
stock and flow diagram requires a brief description of the elements included:  
- Stocks (square variables): accumulation of material/information resources at a 
given moment in time;  
- Flows (arrows with valves): flows of materials/information to or from a stock over 
a period of time; 
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- Auxiliary variables (round variables): elements that help the calculation, mostly 
indicators, parameters or constants.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: An SDF diagram 
In the figure above the CLD structure displayed in figure 2.3 has been re-built in SFD 
terms. The image also provides a legend describing the symbols that represent stocks, flows 
and auxiliaries.  
The interaction between multiple loops determines the overall system behavior. The 
following graph shows a simulation of the simple model described above. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: S-shaped pattern 
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As we can see, the initial exponential growth behavior, driven by the reinforcing loop, was 
then substituted by an exponential decay pattern after the second year. This generated an S-
shaped behaviour caused by the shift in loop dominance over time. 
What emerges from this simple system and its behaviour is the importance of the delays 
and nonlinearities. A nonlinear relationship affects the ‘strength’ of the feedback loop2 in 
which it is included, determining at a system level a switch in pattern (from exponential 
growth to exponential decay). In the same way, time delays (e.g. the time for Public Service 
Quality to affect migration) can be crucial elements influencing the dynamic behaviour of a 
system. In the example previously discussed the time that Public Service Quality takes to 
affect migration determines the moment at which the behaviour experiences a shifting loop 
dominance.  
 
2.1.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of System Dynamics 
 
“All models are wrong” writes Sterman (2002) about the validity of SD models. With this 
sentence, which is also the title of his article, he means that our knowledge of complex 
systems is limited and therefore we have to simplify our models so we can represent the 
complexity within them. Since SD models cannot be ‘right’, their validity comes from their 
usefulness (Meadows, 1980; Sterman, 2002). This means that a model can be considered valid 
only as long as it is able to depict the dynamics of the phenomena under analysis. Such a 
concept of validity is coherent with the fact that System Dynamics models are not directed at 
problems of precise prediction, but are interested in general dynamic tendencies.  
Even though Barlas (1996) identifies some formal qualitative aspects for model validation, 
there is no precise quantitative index for summarizing this process (Meadows, 1980). This is 
                                                          
2
 The ability to drive the overall system behaviour.  
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mainly due to the feedback structure which makes parameter estimation and sensitivity 
analysis problematic.  
Despite these validation issues, the features that make SD particularly attractive for 
applying it to public policies and wicked issues are the ability to frame complex systems, and 
the possibility of simulating and understanding the main determinants of counterintuitive 
behaviours.  
SD is not the only methodology that allows us to carry out systemic analysis. There are 
others ‘soft OR’ methods that offer similar improvements in mapping systems’ structures 
(Pidd, 1996; Akkermans & van Oorschot, 2005). Among these, Pidd (1996) identifies ‘Soft 
System Methodology’ (SSM) and ‘Cognitive Mapping’.   
Both Cognitive Mapping and SSM share with SD the aim of dealing with complexity 
through a systemic approach (Checkland, 1988; Eden, 2004) and have been considered useful 
for tackling ‘wicked’ problems (Eden, 2004; Head & Alford, 2013; Hjort & Bagheri, 2006; 
Lane & Oliva, 1998). Even though each of these three approaches could be equally well 
employed in mapping complex structures (Akkermans & van Oorschot, 2005), SD modelling 
has a distinctive feature: simulation. Simulation in fact allows us to test the implicit 
assumptions about dynamic behaviours coming from the mapped structures (Akkermans & 
van Oorschot, 2005).  
The value of simulation as a scientific method lies mainly in three features (Axelrod, 
1997): prediction (or forecasting), existence proof, and discovery (of new structures). 
However, in social sciences such as management, this value also lies in its educational and 
training features. Sterman (2014) considers simulation the main tool we may use in order to 
discover how complex systems work when real experimentation is too slow, too costly, 
unethical or just plain impossible; that is, for most of the social issues, such as urban 
transportation. 
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However, it is important to mention that SD is not the only method allowing us to simulate 
a systems’ behaviour. Another simulation technique that emerged in the social sciences in 
recent years is Agent Based Modelling (ABM).  
Both SD and ABM use computer simulation techniques for investigating social systems 
characterized by non-linear causal relations, with a focus on both understanding and 
qualitative prediction of a system’s behaviour (Schieritz & Milling, 2003). Due to this, the 
two techniques have a broad overlapping area in management research. Even though SD and 
ABM can be used to describe the same phenomena, there are some differences between these 
techniques that may result in different simulation outputs. These differences mainly concern 
(Schieritz & Milling, 2003): the level of analysis that is ‘macro’ in SD and ‘micro’ in ABM 
(forest vs trees); the top-down perspective of SD differs from the bottom-up one adopted by 
ABM modelers; the basic building block of modelling which is the ‘feedback loop’ for SD 
and the ‘agent’ for ABM; and the concept of time, continuous in SD and discrete in ABM. 
While on the one hand it might be more challenging to conduct a structural analysis through 
ABM due to its poor definition (Jennings et al., 1998; Schieritz & Milling, 2003), on the other 
hand ABM allows us to include other characteristics of the social system (such as spatial 
explicitness) that may overcomplicate a SD model. Based on both the objective of a research 
(structure and/or behaviour) and the level of the analysis a researcher wants to achieve (agent 
or system), one simulation method can be more consistent than the other. 
Given the characteristics hereby analysed, SD results to be an adequate method to study 
governance issues in a wicked context. This consideration arises from the fact that SD allows 
us to conduct structural analysis of a system considering its multiple institutional levels. 
Furthermore, the focus of SD models on the understanding of general dynamic tendencies 
gives us room to lay out this study following a pragmatic approach of research. As previously 
discussed, wicked problems cannot be understood or solved by scientific knowledge (Head & 
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Alford, 2013). Therefore, purely positivistic or realistic paradigms are not entirely adequate 
for an analysis aimed at understanding and tackling wickedness. 
Furthermore, SD is also valuable for this study inasmuch it may be framed adopting 
Performance Management Theory fundamentals (Bianchi, 2012). On the one hand this allows 
for the use in the current study of the same language present in previous studies about 
performance in public management; on the other it helps traditional PM approaches to 
overcome those pitfalls that were mentioned in the first chapter of this work. 
 
2.2. A Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) perspective 
 
System Dynamics, in addition to provide the holistic perspective claimed in the previous 
paragraphs, may help PM framework at solving the shortcoming identified by literature: lack 
of a dynamic perspective orientated at tackle complexity, being excessively static in terms of 
time and space. 
The firsts contributions of SD applied to PM research can be found in 1984. The pioneers 
of this scientific field have been John Morecroft (1984, 1985, 1999) and Kim Warren (1999, 
2000, 2004, 2005). Their approach originates from the Resource-based View (RBV) of the 
organization focusing on the build-up and defense of competitive advantages. In order to 
overcome the lack of a dynamic perspective, the authors proposed a Dynamic RBV (DRBV) 
of the firm achievable through the support of simulation models. These models are focused on 
both building-up and depletion processes of core assets including workers, equipment, 
population, workload, perceived service quality, and financial resources. Each strategic 
resources can, to some extent, be controlled in isolation of the others; however, where there is 
not balanced growth or coherence in the assets, then organizations will be unable to grow to 
achieve their own potential, or might grow in a non-sustainable way (Bianchi et al., 2015). In 
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other words, these studies remarked that the management of strategic resources, and more 
specifically the maintenance of an appropriate balance between such assets, is the key to 
sustainable development (Morecroft, 1999; Warren, 2008). 
An interesting development of Morecroft and Warren studies can be found in Winch & 
Bianchi (2006), Bianchi (2010, 2012), Bianchi et al. (2010), Cosenz & Noto (2014). Moving 
from the same findings of Morecroft and Warren, they recommend a complementary 
approach focusing on the identification of end-results and the related performance indicators 
which aim to drive the strategic resource allocation. Such an approach – named Dynamic PM 
(DPM) – aims to explore how end-results provide an endogenous source to the accumulation 
and depletion processes affecting strategic resources within a system. Results can be modelled 
as in- or out-flows, which change over a given time span the corresponding stocks of strategic 
resources, as a result of actions implemented by decision-makers. 
Both SD and PM combination approaches – Dynamic RBV and Dynamic PM - represent 
strategic resources as ‘stocks’. An example could be given by the ‘number of vehicles’ in a 
transportation system: it is a variable that can be measured in unit and that can be observed at 
a given moment in time. 
However, while a dynamic resource-based view concentrates the analysis on these 
variables, and the relative models are designed based on the building up and decline of key 
core assets, a dynamic performance management view approaches the system analysis by 
identifying both end-results and performance indicators (Bianchi et al., 2015). 
End-results are typically represented as ‘flows’. A flow is what changes the stock over a 
period of time. Back to the number of vehicles’ example, one of its flow is the ‘vehicle 
purchasing rate’. This, that can be measured as unit per time, says to us how much ‘number of 
vehicles’ has changed during the time period considered.  
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End-results depend from intermediate results (performance drivers or indicators) that are 
causally determined by the employment of strategic resources. These indicators are usually 
measured in relative terms by comparing the actual state of a variable with a target value or a 
benchmark. The gap this comparison creates, represents the intermediate result the 
management should monitor in order to achieve the end-results. When dealing with social 
issues such as transportation, indicators should not focus only on economic measures but 
should also include aspect relative to other dimensions of performance (Eccles, 1991; Coda, 
2010) in respect to the holistic perspective mentioned above. 
The model structure is then obtained by linking the relevant stocks and flows which 
determine a certain behaviour of the system over time (Cosenz, 2010). The feedback loops 
built by following this approach, imply that the flows affecting strategic resources are 
measured over a time lag. This makes clear how the delays involved in the resources 
accumulation process represent a central issue in managing performance in a dynamic and 
complex environment such as the one studied here. 
This approach provides a systemic view of a production/provision process since each 
performance indicator shows how the employment of the linked strategic resources affects all 
the other interdependent resources within the system (Bianchi et al., 2015). Due to this 
interdependence, each strategic resource has indeed the power to foster or not others in the 
same system. For example, financial resources affect the number of vehicles available to the 
service through new investments; the number of vehicles available impacts on the distance 
travelled during year, and this last determines the amount of public resources assigned. Public 
funds increase net income which, over time, influences the financial resources value 
positively. 
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Figure 2.7: A Dynamic Performance Management view (from Bianchi et al., 2015) 
Figure 2.7 illustrates the dynamic performance management framework. The analysis starts 
from the bottom of the diagram which concerns end-results identification. These are causally 
related to performance indicators variables, which are represented as auxiliary variables (in 
black). These indicators represent the intermediate results that explain how the final ones are 
achieved. Performance indicators depend (causal relationship) on the usage of the strategic 
resources (square variables). Strategic resources accumulate value when the end-results are 
achieved and decrease value when they are employed in a new production/provision cycle.   
Particularly relevant for this study, and related to the DPM approach, are the ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ perspectives defined by Bianchi (2010) that suggest the adoption of an inter-
institutional level of analysis to better frame the value dynamics of public organizations, seen 
as ‘loosely-coupled’ institutions. While at the single-institution level performance is assessed 
primarily in relation to the effects produced by decision-makers on their own organization, at 
the inter-institutional level, performance is assessed in relation to the effects produced by 
decision-makers on the wider system, which comprehend multiple institutions, i.e. the urban 
area (Bianchi, 2010, 2012). The inter-institutional system’s performance does not correspond 
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to the mere sum of the performance of each single institution, but can be defined as “the net 
relationships and synergies among the different institutions linked to each other” (Bianchi, 
2012, pp. 147). 
In order to assess performance at an inter-institutional level Bianchi (2010, 2012) suggest 
as a first step of analysis to firstly focus on performance at a single-institution level. This 
allows the analyst to understand how the organization is likely to positively contribute to the 
generation of public value. Public value creation will then provide the conditions for the 
generation of new value to the benefit of each institution participating the system (Bianchi, 
2012). 
Such a shift from a micro to a wider system perspective allows us to broad the boundaries 
of the analysis without losing the focus on the performance assessment.  
 
 
Figure 2.8: The institutional and inter-institutional levels for analysing multi-level governance framework (Bianchi, 
2012) 
Figure 2.8 shows how a DPM approach is likely to include different governance levels 
when applied to a case. Strategic resources affecting the service performance can be owned by 
several stakeholders. In order to insure a proper endowment of such resources and to keep a 
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proper balance between the different strategic resources it is necessary that the governance 
levels coordinates their action. 
DPM is the approach chosen for tackle this research work. It characteristics permit us to set 
out the study in terms of performance management, overcoming those limits that do not allow 
traditional tools to deal with complexity and wickedness. Furthermore, DPM takes into 
account the inter-institutional environment in which a public transportation service is 
provided. 
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Chapter 3: Palermo’s Case Study 
 
 
3.1 The Case Background  
 
In Italy public transportation development in the last 40 years can be divided in different 
eras (Della Porta and Gitto, 2013).  
The first one, named ‘municipal capitalism age’, started at the beginning of 1900 and was 
characterized by a strong focus on the urban dimension and the social function of the urban 
transportation service. This phase, which was historically determined by the weaknesses of 
Italian economy of that time, consisted in the in-house provision of the service by the 
government, through the employment of municipalized firms. 
A second phase, interesting the years between 1980 and 2012, and called regionalism, may 
be divided in two stages. The first one was aimed at integrating the urban service with the 
extra-urban one. In those years the concept of Public Local Transportation, that is a 
transportation service focused on the territory and not on the single municipality within its 
boundaries, emerged. A National Fund of Transport was introduced (Law 151/1981) so as to 
cover the expenditure of agencies that were free to rely on subsidies, since the public 
transportation service was not considered financially sustainable. However, this ultimately 
provoked an increase in the expenditure, creating a huge deficit in the public transport sector. 
In order to overcome such pitfalls, a NPM oriented reform was introduced in 1997 by the 
government. Italian NPM has been mainly characterized by a political orientation toward 
power decentralization to local governments and privatization of public companies (Anselmi, 
1995; Rebora, 1999). Nowadays, local utilities in Italy are often run by joint stock companies 
controlled by public agencies such as Regional and Municipal Administrations. This creates a 
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multi-level governance structure in which public services are provided by these subsidiaries 
through service contracts. The pressures and the constraints arising from different institutional 
levels, with diverse goals and service expectation, could render a top management 
intervention more complicated. Eventually, such a governance implies an administrative 
fragmentation that is depriving both the political and administrative bodies of levers of control 
and information, raising questions of accountability and capacity (Christensen & Laegreid, 
2007).  
From 1997, and particularly after the reforms of 2005 and 2011, this situation has been 
made even more complicated by the introduction of the European Union ‘Stability and 
Growth Pact’ (SGP). This is a rule-based framework for the coordination of national fiscal 
policies in the European Union. It was established to safeguard sound public finances, based 
on the principle that economic policies are a matter of shared concern for all Member States 
(Lo Bue, 2014). The adoption of this framework by the Italian Government determined 
serious limits to the expenses that local agencies can undertake in order to balance their 
budgets. Therefore, even these joint stock companies are under pressure from the local 
authorities to balance their budget with decreasing resources, and the same level of quality 
standard of the service expected (for example, Palermo’s transportation utility service contract 
was reduced by 20% from 2011 to 2012). Furthermore, the Italian ‘Stability Pact’ 2014 
established new constraints for local authorities’ subsidiaries.   
 
 3.2 The Governance Structure of Palermo’s Transportation System 
 
The case here presented is based on the urban transportation service in Palermo. The 
service is run by AMAT S.p.A.. This, since 2005, is a joint stock company in which the 
Municipality of Palermo holds the 100% of shares. On the one hand, being formally private, 
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the company is accountable for its economic and financial performance; on the other hand 
AMAT faces several constraints coming from both the service contracts stipulated with the 
Municipality—who imposes significant personnel policies —and from the influence of the 
Sicilian Region—i.e., the Region allocates the 50% of the total funds the utility receives and 
decide the minimum ticket price this may ask to the citizens.  
This fragmented structure made AMAT experiencing a dynamic problem consisting in a 
decreasing net income which results, over time, non-sustainable in each performance 
dimension. 
Figure 2 synthesizes the multi-level governance structure in which the utility operates. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The governance structure 
In Italy, Regions constitute the second level of Public Administrations. Sicilian Region 
influences the utility activities directly (by deciding the ticket price) and indirectly (by 
transferring funds to the municipality that have to be devoted to urban transportation). The 
Municipality of Palermo, on its side, corresponds a fixed amount of funds to AMAT every 
year. On the other hand, holding the 100% of the utility shares, the economic performance of 
AMAT influences results and strategies of the Municipality itself. At the bottom of the 
54 
 
governance structure presented in Figure 3.1, we find the community, namely, citizens and 
visitors of Palermo and its territory. AMAT provides the service to them and if it does not 
match their expectations this will badly influence both the utility performance in terms of 
ticket sold, and the others governance levels (because of the lower level of public value 
generated) when elections time comes. 
The governance structure described above falls into the ‘authority initiative’ category of 
organizational form. The public sphere plays the role of the supplier through a public network 
of actors. AMAT has indeed the legal monopoly of initiative in the sense that autonomous 
market entry is legally impossible and that all production or market entry is the result of a 
conscious one-sided authority initiative to produce or request the production of services (Van 
de Velde, 1999). 
 
 
Figure 3.21: Palermo's organizational form of public transportation 
When building a model upon this case we need to take into account the governance 
structure displayed in figure 3.1 since it influences and sometimes generates, important causal 
relationships responsible for the whole-system’s behaviour (Bianchi et al., 2010; Bivona & 
Montemaggiore, 2010; Winch, 2010). 
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The model was built with the aim of simulating AMAT performance. Being this last the 
service provider, a model able at simulating its performance behaviour would allow us to 
understand the system structure. It would be possible to analyse where and how the wicked 
problems that the service faces originates. However, this does not mean that the inter-
institutional structure of the governance were not considered. Connections among governance 
levels would be made explicit through causal relationships and, once the performance 
indicators will be identified, it will be clear who and how influence each of those. As a result, 
an SD model and a set of performance indicators were built that allowed us to run the 
analysis.  
The main assumption behind the case study refers to a population that does not change. 
This choice was made since this variable has been pretty much stable during the period 
considered
3
. 
The data needed to develop the case and build the model have been collected thanks to 
several meetings with four AMAT top managers (economic and financial director, human 
resources director, maintenance department director, transport service director), and an 
interview with the ‘Transportation of people department’ director at Sicilian Region. These 
meetings helped in building a qualitative structure of Palermo’s model (namely a Causal Loop 
Diagram). Once the system was structured, thanks to a deep document analysis (balance 
sheets from 2008 to 2012, service contracts with Municipality of Palermo and Region of 
Sicily) a quantitative SD model was built (Stock and Flow (SF) model).  
SF structure was needed in order to distinguish among strategic resources and end-results 
and to identify the relative performance indicators. Also SF diagram allowed the simulation of 
the analysis results. As the model building process is iterative, the formulation of the SF 
model helped in testing and adjusting the first CLD sketch. The variable chosen as reference 
                                                          
3
 Source ISTAT.  
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mode for this case study is AMAT net income. This represents the main result which the 
management monitors and aims to achieve, and it is computed as the residual of all revenues 
and gains over all expenses and losses for the period (Stickney et al., 2009). 
 
3.3 Palermo’s Model 
 
3.3.1 A Causal Loop Diagram 
Through the CLD it is possible to identify the system feedback loops responsible for the 
system performance behaviour. Each link constitutes a hypothesis based on the key actors 
meetings. In the diagram below it is displayed the CLD with the identification of the main 
loops. 
Figure 3.3 shows three main reinforcing loops related to the dynamics generating revenues, 
and two balancing loops concerning the origins of costs. Additionally, two more reinforcing 
loops show the feedbacks from the community to the service quality standard, while another 
balancing loop refers to debts.  
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Figure 3.3: Palermo's case CLD 
In Figure 3, Rs and Bs identify the systems’ loops. R stands for ‘reinforcing’ and B for 
‘balancing’. 
R1 loop shows how net income is connected to cash flow; a positive cash flow gives the 
company the possibility to invest in new buses. The presence of new buses makes the 
company able to provide the service with more frequency. This directly impacts on the 
number of km travelled every year which, based on the service contract with the Sicilian 
Region, determines the amount of funds the same Region would allocate to AMAT for its 
service. These funds are one of the main determinants of company’s revenues, base of 
calculus for net income.  
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B1 loop represents the dynamic by which an increase in number of buses - determined by 
cash availability and, therefore, incomes - increases, over time, the cost of maintenance which 
will be added to the total cost the company yearly incurs. Total cost is the negative component 
of the net income. 
B2 loop represents the higher cost the company incurs in when number of km travelled per 
year grows. In fact, when number of km travelled increases, due to a bigger frequency related 
to an increase in the number of buses available, total cost of gasoline increases. 
B3 loop shows the company’s debt policy. Simply, whenever the cash flow goes below 
zero, AMAT management is willing in increase its debt. While every time the cash flow is 
positive, AMAT management is willing to use part of it to reduce its debt. 
R2 and R3 loops represent the dynamics relative to service quality. These loops were built 
based on the hypothesis that service quality mainly depends on the extensiveness of service, 
its frequency and its timeliness. An improvement of service in these directions would 
determine an improvement in quality as perceived by citizens and customers. As the 
perceived quality of service increases, customers’ satisfaction will grow and revenues coming 
from ticket sale will increase. This will positively affect net income that, determining the cash 
level, may allow the manager to invest in new buses in order to ensure a better service quality. 
Concluding, R4 and R5 loops show how an increase in service quality may cause, over 
time, a reduction in private transportation and so in traffic congestion which will allow buses 
to run faster and more frequently.  
A last comment on the CLD regards the boundaries of the system, that is to say, the 
variables considered exogenous (namely, variable not influenced by any other factor within 
the system). This study considers exogenous the extensiveness (number of bus routes), ticket 
price, the revenues coming from the municipality service contract and a variable directly 
impacting on the cash flow: other funds.  
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The number of lines is determined unilaterally by the Municipality, while the ticket price is 
decided by the Sicilian Region. 
The reason why the municipality service contract has been considered exogenous resides in 
the fact that this contract is characterized by a fixed amount of money that does not change in 
base of any parameters.  
Other funds represent not-planned funds coming from ‘external’ actors such as the 
European Union (this is what happened in 2011, where € 20 million funds were attributed to 
AMAT by the Municipality in order to buy new buses). 
A particular remark is due in explaining the decision making process regarding personnel 
area.  
As the reader may notice, the staff variable is not affected by any others. This could sound 
curious since, being ‘Labor’ one of the component of any production function, total staff 
should receive at least a feedback from the activity size. What surprise in this case study it is 
that, due to the Municipality influence and to the Italian Stability Pact (Articles 550-569 of 
the Italian Law n.147/2013), the top management is not able to modify human resource 
availability when needed.  
 
3.3.2 Stock and Flow Model 
The conversion from a CLD to a SF model is a necessary step to do for conducting the 
performance analysis and for simulating the results of the structural analysis conducted above. 
The SF model structure allows us to read the causal relationships of the system by adopting a 
Dynamic Performance Management perspective. 
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As already stated, in order to define performance indicators, a DPM approach starts from 
the identification of the system’s end-results. The main end-result here identified is the net 
income. This depends on the total cost and the total revenues. 
Revenues come from ticket sales, municipality service contract and regional funds. The 
municipality service contract is not depending on any variable, but it has been negotiated as a 
fixed amount of money the Municipality of Palermo correspond to AMAT each year for the 
transportation service. Regional funds depends on the total funds Sicilian Region assigns to 
local transportation each year and on the number of km travelled by the company.  
Ticket sales revenues are determined as the number of tickets sold times the ticket price. 
This last variable has a minimum value fixed by Sicilian Region. The number of tickets sold 
depends on customer satisfaction and, therefore, on service quality. Through the meetings 
with AMAT managers emerged how the most significant service quality determinants are: 
service extensiveness, service frequency and service timeliness.  
Service frequency and extensiveness, together with the average route length determines the 
distance travelled and so the regional funds assigned. 
While service extensiveness – that has been measured as number of lines – depends on 
political choices, service frequency and timeliness are affected by both number of buses and 
number of drivers available for the service. Frequency and timeliness also depends on the 
average speed of buses which is affected by traffic congestion. This last mainly depends on 
the rate of private transportation modes usage that is influenced by the service quality itself.  
Frequency indicator has been measured as the number of trips done during the year divided 
by the number of trips done during the first year considered by this analysis. Timeliness has 
been measured as the number of trips planned against the number of trips lost for each year. 
As already stated and explained, personnel policy has been taken as exogenous in this 
model. The number of vehicles available – which also affects service frequency and 
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timeliness - depends on the amount of investments made. The fleet characteristics, and in 
particular average bus age impact on the maintenance cost that, together with the other costs 
(personnel, gasoline, depreciation, etc.) determines the total cost, negative component of the 
net income.  
The investments AMAT makes depend on the financial resource availability which are 
influenced both by the business management results and the debt policy. 
In figure 3.4 it is shown a simplified version of the SF model regarding Palermo’s case4.  
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 The full map and list of equations of the model can be found in Appendix A. 
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Figure 3.4: Palermo’s case SFD (simplified version; the full version of the model comprehensive of equation is available in the Appendix) 
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The simulations results are portrayed in Figure 3.5. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Simulation results 
Line 1 (Reference Net Income) represents the historical data taken from the official 
balance sheets (2009–2012). Line 2 (Net Income) represents the result of the model 
simulation. As we may notice, the system has encountered a dynamic problem which consist 
in a non-economic sustainability.  
Replicating the system behavior with a low deviation from the historical data is important 
but it is not enough to demonstrate the reliability of the model (Barlas, 1996). Therefore, some 
other tests (structure verification test, extreme condition test and sensitivity analysis) have been 
conducted in order to validate the model. Also, once the model was built, further discussions on 
its structure were conducted with AMAT managers in order to get feedback and further insights 
on the case study. 
The diagram in figure 3.4 also shows the performance indicators (colored circles) defined 
by the adoption of a DPM approach. This are listed and discussed as follows: 
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Indicator 1 - Distance Travelled: This indicator was built by comparing distance 
travelled (measured in number of km) by the company’s buses during the year, with the 
distance requested by the Municipality and the Region in order to perform the service 
contracts duties. Given the company resources, this is an effectiveness indicator that shows 
AMAT’s ability to perform a specific service requirement. Distance travelled depends on 
extensiveness (number of lines) and frequency of service. Given the resources in terms of 
buses and drivers, it is AMAT having a major role in ensuring a satisfying frequency of lines 
to offer to customers.  
Indicator 2 - Buses’ Age: Buses’ age indicator impacts directly on cost of maintenance. 
Buses younger than five year cause an ordinary cost of maintenance (i.e., filters, oil, etc.); 
non-ordinary costs (i.e., engine repair) are at the expenses of bus suppliers. Buses older than 
five years determine a bigger cost for AMAT since it is in charge of both ordinary and non-
ordinary costs. This intermediate result is affected by the investment rate (bus purchase rate). 
The investment rate appears mainly determined at a municipal level (through the allocation of 
specific funds).  
Indicator 3 - Ticket Price: Ticket price, as microeconomic literature may support, has a 
direct impact on the demand of service. The minimum ticket price is determined by Sicilian 
Region. The company is allowed to apply a lower price only if the municipality guarantees to 
pay out the difference between the two prices multiplied by the number of tickets sold during 
the year. This means the company cannot modify the ticket price in relation to demand 
variations.  
Indicator 4 - Nr of Lines: The extensiveness of service was measured as the number of 
lines the company offers. Today AMAT service runs through ninety lines. From the top 
management interview emerged how this number is mainly affected by the political sphere. 
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Politicians impose the presence of many non-remunerative lines in order to ensure the public 
service to citizens.  
Indicator 5 – Frequency: This indicator is measured as a ratio between the actual 
service’s frequency and the initial one (in 2009). Frequency ratio is an indicator of 
effectiveness, and measures the ability of the company at optimizing its resources (buses and 
drivers) in order to ensure as much frequency as possible.  
Indicator 6 – Timeliness: This indicator is the ratio that measures the rate of trips done 
over the total trips planned. The main variables that affect this indicators are: lack of drivers, 
lack of bus available and traffic congestion. 
 
3.4 Discussion and Policy Options 
 
What emerges from the indicators analysis is that many players may be considered 
responsible of the service performance. When one indicator is depending on a resource owned 
or controlled by other players than AMAT, that resource do not get any feedback from the 
system performance (see ticket price or number of lines). The more ‘endogenized’ is the 
resources in the system (that is to say, the stronger are the feedbacks a resource gets from the 
system), the more the system’s player can effectively intervene on the connected performance 
driver (Noto & Bianchi, 2015).  
In this case, three out of six indicators (buses’ age, ticket price and number of lines) are 
mainly depending on other governance levels. This situation, which is pretty common in 
organizations providing public services, makes the different governance players managing the 
resources under their control solely to pursue their individual aims. The set of indicators 
provided would inform these actors about how the system works and therefore encourage 
them to adopt a systemic view. This would facilitate the alignment of aims between the 
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various stakeholders, which is the first step for pursuing the coordination claimed by the 
Joint-up government reform (Noto & Bianchi, 2015). 
In order to foster coordination, it is therefore necessary to reform the system structure so 
that the exogenous strategic resources (such as ticket price) can get feedbacks from the system 
itself; like that, new loops will be added to the system ‘endogenizing’ new processes relevant 
for the service provision (Noto & Bianchi, 2015). This structural change is based on 
communication and information exchange between stakeholders owning strategic resources.  
3.4.1 Policy options  
The performance indicators analysis gives a clear understanding of how fragmentation and 
multi-level governance impact on the service performance. Creating a feedback from system 
performance to the system resources may resolve the effects of fragmentation of actions 
among the governance players involved. Therefore two policies that creates such loops has 
been tested through the model. 
The first policy concern the ‘endogenization’ of ticket price value decisions. Figure 3.6 
shows the new loop (B4). 
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Figure 3.6: Policy option 1 - ticket price indicator 
R2 is one of the loops representing the dynamics relative to citizen/customer satisfaction. 
This loop is based on the hypothesis that customer satisfaction depends on the frequency of 
service. A service improvement in these directions would lead to an improvement in quality 
as perceived by citizens and customers. As the perceived quality of service increases, 
customers’ satisfaction grows and ticket sale revenues will also increase. This will positively 
affect net income. ‘Tickets sold’ is a strategic resource influenced not only by customer 
satisfaction but also by the ticket price level. Ticket price value is a strategic resource 
controlled by the Sicilian Region. This governance level does not get any feedback from the 
company performance (in terms of tickets sold) in order to decide how much to ask to citizens 
for a ticket. Adding a new causal link (dashed in the above figure) and a new flow (‘Chg in 
Ticket price’) to the existent structure would give to the Sicilian Region the possibility to 
intervene on this variable more consciously and to take into consideration the effects on the 
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whole system. With this new link we then create a new feedback loop (B4) which strengthens 
the coordination between the governance levels involved, now able to jointly intervene on the 
‘ticket price’ indicator. 
In order to test such a policy, the model was simulated (figure 3.7) in the mid-term future 
(from 2009 to 2020) with (line 2) and without the proposed solution (line 1). In both cases the 
net income experiences a growing path. This is due to the fact that, even when no policies are 
applied, the net income trend of the firsts years after the historical data were collected is 
characterized by a transient behavior and then tend to settle at about – 7 mln €. In figure 3.7 is 
it possible to observe how applying this new feedback policy the net income, after a worse 
result in the short term, shows a better result in the mid-term.  
The second graph of figure 3.7 displays the behavior of the Ticket Price indicator. The 
declining trend that this indicator was experiencing before the policy application has been 
divert thanks to the new feedback process. 
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Figura 3.7: Policy option 1 - results 
By looking at the policy effects we notice that, even though they show a better result than 
if no policies would be applied, this solution is not satisfactory since the net income is still  
negative at the end of the considered period. Also, if we observe the pattern of the service 
quality (figure 3.8), which can be considered a good measure of value created, we see that it 
still remains below the reference value (1.00) and does not present a decisive growing path 
after the policy application. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Policy option 1 - value creation 
The second policy designed and tested concerns the feedback that the buses age indicator 
may give to the Municipality in order to receive more funds to be invested in new vehicles. 
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Like that, whenever the average bus age is higher than the benchmark one, the Municipality 
will correspond more funds to the service provider so as to buy new buses. In order to 
strengthen this policy we can also decide to increase the percentage of bus acquisition on total 
investment from the initial 30% to 70% if the revenue from the Municipality of Palermo are 
bigger than a certain amount (i.e. € 28 mln). 
The diagram displayed in figure 3.9 shows the cost loop (B1) already described and the 
new reinforcing loop (R6) that relates the system performance (buses age indicator) to an 
exogenous resource (Municipality Service Contract). Whenever the buses age indicator scores 
below its reference benchmark (10 years), the Municipality receives this information and 
allocates more funds to the provider for investing in new assets. More funds from the 
Municipality increase the total revenues and so the net income. A bigger net income will be 
translated, over a collection time, in a bigger cash-inflow that allows AMAT to increase its 
investments in new vehicles. An increase in the bus fleet due to new buses incoming lowers 
the average buses ages toward its goal and has an impact on the cost of maintenance per bus 
unit.  
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Figure 3.9: Policy option 2 - bus age indicator 
Adding a new causal link (dashed in the above figure) and a new flow (‘Chg in MSC’) to 
the existent structure would give the Municipality of Palermo the possibility to intervene on 
this variable more consciously taking into consideration the effects on the whole system. 
Applying such a policy results in a better performance and a net income that within 8 years 
become positive. The first graph displayed in figure 3.10 shows the net income without any 
policy application (line1) and the same variable simulated with the implementation of the new 
R6 loop. The second graph shows how the buses age performance indicator develops by 
applying this policy. Even in this case we may observe a decisive change of trend in the 
performance indicator behavior from when the policy has been applied.  
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Figure 3.10: Policy option 2 - results 
This solution also resulted to have a stronger impact on the creation of public value. As we 
may notice in following graph the service quality starts a rapid and determined growth from 
2013 (first year of policy application).  
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Figure 3.11: Policy option 2 - value creation 
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Chapter 4: Buenos Aires’ Case Study 
 
 
4.1 The Case Background 
 
Transportation sector represents one of the major priorities for Argentinian government. 
This consideration emerges from the data about the direct public investment, where 
transportation holds the 70% of the total public expenditure (Barbero et al., 2011). 
The Argentinian urban transportation system has been object of much interest in the last 
fifteen years. During the ‘90s the sector underwent major reforms, which were addressed at 
solving problems related to low service quality, low infrastructure investment rate, and 
financial weakness displayed by the sector. For these reasons the system was reformed 
through privatization and deregulation, in accordance with the NPM reform that was 
happening all over the world during those years.  
The financial crisis that shook Argentina in 2001 drastically changed the role of the state in 
this sector, and more generally in the whole economy. Between 2002 and 2009, public direct 
investment in Argentinian economy experienced a tenfold increase. The sector that was the 
most influenced by this rise of public investment was the transportation one, which went from 
an expenditure of 0.15% of GDP in 2002, to that of 0.70% of GDP in 2009 (Barbero et al. 
2011). At this time the fares for urban transportation service were locked and the national 
government started to invest a growing amount of public money so as to help users to get 
easier access to the service, while supporting private concessioners that were unable to deal 
with the financial crisis. 
After these two waves of reforms, three main elements characterize today urban 
transportation in Argentina (Barbero et al., 2011): a strong policy of public investment in the 
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system; a rapid growth in demand generating traffic congestion problems; a constant growth 
in the amount of subsidies given to service suppliers. 
 
4.2 The Governance Structure of Buenos Aires’ Transportation System 
 
Public transportation in Argentina may be defined as a hybrid system (Barbero et al., 
2011). In fact, the service is run by private entities, but the decision-making process happens 
at a state level. By looking at it through an NPM perspective we notice how decisions, funds 
for investments, and expenditures are matters of concern for the national level (i.e., the reform 
has not been directed toward the decentralization of power to local administrations). At the 
same time, a service run by private companies demonstrates the implementation of a far-
reaching reforming program towards market mechanisms in comparison to Italy. 
 
 
Figura 4.1: The governance structure 
In the figure above is displayed the governance model of the Argentinian transportation 
system. Comparing to the Italian case, we may notice that the top governance level (national 
government) interacts directly with the service providers, bypassing the level of local 
authorities (i.e. municipalities or provinces). The central state provides funds and a regulatory 
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framework for the providers to operate. The latter deliver the service to the community, and 
give feedbacks to the central government in terms of tickets sold and quality requirements. 
Finally, the community responds to the service quality by choosing whether to use the service, 
and giving a feedback to the political level when the election time comes.  
This organizational form, which is formally based on market initiatives, is nevertheless 
strongly influenced by the role of central authority. Even though private companies run the 
service through their own assets, the centralization of the decision-making process at state 
level puts urban transportation under the supervision of a centralized and professionalized 
bureaucracy. Therefore, although we cannot talk about a form of legal monopoly, we can 
consider this organizational form as a combination between a “concessions to privates” 
regime (authority initiative) and a “regulated authorization” regime (market initiative).  
In this organizational form, the main role that the government plays is a subsidising one, 
granting fare rebates to the users. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Buenos Aires' organizational mode of public transportation 
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As previously mentioned, starting from 2001 the central government enhanced its 
contribution in terms of public expenditure in the transportation sector. Much of public funds 
(43%) have been allocated to the FFSIT fund (Fondo Fiduciario del Sistema de Infraestructura 
del Transporte) for the subsidiary policy that allows concessioners to keep fares locked. 
Another relevant share of these funds (22%) has been allocated to the urban mobility within 
the capital city (Barbero et al., 2011).  
The FFSIT fund was created in 2001 with the aim of supporting the transportation system. 
FFSIT gets funds from four different sources: National Treasure funding (Aportes del Tesoro 
Nacional), gasoline taxes, debt issuing from the National Bank (BNA), interests, and fines 
(Castro & Szenkman, 2012). It has been estimated that about 70% of the providers’ revenue 
comes from those funds. 
The policy behind the creation of this fund is ‘supply-subsides’ based: moneys are 
transferred to private providers so as to compensate for the fares’ locking. In this way the 
government provides indirect help to the service users. However, some researchers (Barbero 
et al., 2011; Castro & Szenkman, 2012) highlighted the risk of distortions deriving from this 
policy’s application, arguing that it may represent a disincentive for providers to improve 
service quality.  
This is what actually happened, between 2003 and 2013: although subsidies to service 
providers grew by more than 400%, the quality of the service did not improve or, in some 
cases, decreased
5
 (Castro & Szenkman, 2012). 
In figure 4.3 it is shown the historical path of the subsides provided to the transportation 
sector in Argentina from 2005 to 2011. As we may observe, this variable shows an 
exponential growth behaviour. 
                                                          
5
 http://www.cnrt.gov.ar/content/estadisticas/automotor accessed on 28/04/2015 
78 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Historical trend of subsidies (http://interactivos.lanacion.com.ar/manual-data/estudio_de_casos_14.html) 
This dynamic problem – raising subsidies and declining quality - has been conceptualized 
thanks to a SD model structured through a DPM approach. The model is focused on a 
particular route operated by a private company (Linea 60 - Micro Ómnibus Norte SA). This 
route connects the five municipalities composing the northern metropolitan region of Buenos 
Aires with the capital city: Escobar, Tigre, San Fernando, San Isidro and Vicente Lopez. The 
region counts about 1.2 million inhabitants. This provider has been chosen since its size in 
terms of number of buses, and the number of people to serve, are similar to that of the Italian 
provider analysed in the previous chapter. However, because of the difficulties connected to 
obtaining the data – i.e. it was not possible to have access to the company’s data –, some 
assumptions have been made (i.e. cost model). The model was built based on interviews with 
experts (the former Director of infrastructure of the City of Buenos Aires, the former Director 
of the Ministry of Public Works of Argentina and an independent researcher) and a deep 
document analysis (contracts, reports
6
).   
  
                                                          
6 http://www.transporte.gov.ar/content/subsidios/  and Lopez M, Wadell J (2007)  Investigación de 
transporte urbano público de Buenos Aires, INTRUPBA. Secretaria de Transporte de la Naciòn Argentina. 
. 
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4.3 Buenos Aires’ model 
 
4.3.1 A Causal Loop Diagram 
 
The model aims to explore the dynamics experienced by the Buenos Aires’ urban 
transportation system between 2000 and 2013. In the following figure a causal loop diagram 
represents the main structure of the model.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Buenos Aires case CLD 
The increase in subsidies is related to the decision, taken by the government in the firsts 
years of the century, of blocking the ticket price for urban transportation services in order to 
make transportation more accessible. In fact, the Government ensures that ticket prices are 
blocked by guaranteeing specific funds to the service providers to cover any shortfall.  
The amount of subsidies each company gets is determined by the gap between the actual 
ticket price and the price the service providers would otherwise apply times the number of 
ticket sold. 
As we may notice the model structure can simply be represented by two loops. A 
reinforcing loop (R1) explains how a certain dotation of financial resources (that depends on 
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the amount of subsidies and on the ticket sold) allows the company to invest more in new 
assets - which may range from new buses to modernizing the service, such as installing air 
conditioning. New assets impact on the service quality that decides users to adopt this mode 
of transportation. The number of trips, multiplied by the average ticket price, determines new 
financial resources the company may use to continue investing in the service. The number of 
trips, however, also have a negative influence on the service quality when the routes reaches 
the maximum carrying capacity of the asset dotation (B1). In fact, if the number of passengers 
surpasses the maximum carrying capacity of the transportation mode, this will negatively 
impact on the travel safety, comfort and on the travel time that will increase. 
 
4.3.2 Stock and Flow model 
 
A Stock and Flow model has been built in order to run a performance analysis and to 
simulate the result so as to get insight into how the system works and what criticalities result 
in the experienced counterintuitive behaviour – namely, a rise in subsidies and a decline in the 
service quality.  
The end-results that have been identified in order to apply a DPM approach to the case are: 
‘change in service quality’ and ‘new investments’ which is the flow feeding the assets level. 
Service quality is determined by the number of assets the company devotes to this route. 
Assets comprehend a wide range of productive factors that go from tangible ones (i.e. buses, 
parking areas, etc.) to intangible ones (i.e. reputation, brand, customer base, etc.). These are 
increased by new investments and decreased by obsolescence and depreciation. In this case 
study, the initial number of assets is assumed to corresponds to an estimated value of the 342 
buses that the company uses on this route. In order to get an equilibrium the investments need 
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to be sufficiently high so as to compensate the obsolescence/depreciation and the constraints 
in capacity. 
The amount of resources invested depends on the financial resources available. The stock 
of resources available can be devoted either to increasing assets or can be put aside as 
dividends for the company’ shareholders.  
Assuming that revenues and costs are collected/payed immediately, financial resources 
depends on incomes minus costs (these lasts were assumed as the 95% of incomes
7
). Incomes 
are generated by the business cycle through multiplying the number of trips time the ticket 
price (as showed in the figure below), and by the amount of subsides the company receives. 
The number of trips depends by both the number of users, and the service quality. This last 
receives a feedback from the amount of trips itself (B1). In fact, given a fixed number of 
assets, the greater the number of trips, the lower the service quality - since a greater number of 
people travels in each bus. 
Figure 4.4 displays the two main loops of the model described above
8
. 
 
Figure 4.5: Business management loops  
                                                          
7
 Data extrapolated from  http://www.indec.mecon.ar/Economico2005/definitivos/inc_definitivos_empresa.asp Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica y Censos – accessed on 28/04/2015. 
8
 The full model map and equations are available in Appendix B. 
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As already stated, incomes also depend on the amount of monthly subsidies the company 
receives. These subsidies are determined by the gap between the actual ticket price and the 
desired price times the number of trips in that period. 
The desired ticket price is initially determined as the actual ticket price, but it increases in 
accordance with trends in inflation. Therefore, due to inflation adjustments, it changes 
annually. 
The subsides come from public funds, in particular from FFSIT fund. In the model 
presented below it is assumed that these are equal to the required subsidies. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Subsidies decision making process 
The number of trips per months - that represents one of the factors of the ‘subsidies locking 
price’ equation - does not changes exclusively due to the influence of service quality but it 
also depends from the average number of trips per month. This has been assumed as a 
percentage of the total population that live in that urban area. 
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In order to estimate the total population and its changes, an ageing chain has been 
developed
9
. The population considered regards the inhabitants of the five municipalities 
through which the route 60 passes.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Ageing Chain Northern Metropolitan Region 
The assumptions of this ageing chain concerns the adoption of the national fertility rate and 
the migration rate. The migration rate (for which precise data was not available) has been 
calculated as the difference between the actual population at the end of the period considered 
and the simulated population without considering any migration flow. 
The number of trips per month is then calculated as the total population of the five 
municipalities multiplied by a percentage corresponding to the usage rate of the route. This 
variable does not change merely because of the changes in population but is also influenced 
by the service quality.  
The model here explained produces the simulations shown below: 
                                                          
9
 Direccion Provincial Estatistica, 2010 
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Figure 4.8: Simulation results 
As we may notice, even if, according to the available data
10
, the subsidies grew from 0 up 
to 18 million AR$ per month (about 50.000 AR$ per bus per month), in less than 13 years, the 
quality of service has experienced a constant decline (Castro & Szenkman, 2013). We can 
conclude that this simple model is able at reproducing the counterintuitive behaviour 
explained above.  
By looking back at figure 3, we may observe how the quality of the service is influenced 
by the number of trips and the assets value. If the number of trips increases due to an increase 
in population (as it happens in the model), it will reduce the service quality level. In order to 
                                                          
10
 http://interactivos.lanacion.com.ar/manual-data/estudio_de_casos_14.html ; http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1607299-
colectivos-el-mejor-negocio-de-la-argentina  
2000                                                                                  2013 
2000                                                                                  2013 
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keep constant this last variable, the assets value should compensate for the negative effect of 
the growing number of trips.  
The assets are influenced by the investment rate of the private company analysed and their 
obsolescence/depreciation rate. The investments should be enough to compensate this last 
variable effect and keep the assets value constant. However, in the scenario portrayed above, 
(growing population and growing number of trips) it is not enough to keep the assets’ stock 
constant in order to maintain a certain quality standard of service. 
In order to tackle this issue the investment flow should take into account the service quality 
behaviour. Even though both investments and quality can be monitored and directly 
influenced by the same service provider, a regulatory intervention is needed to avoid possible 
behavioural distortion inducing the company to use the financial resources received for 
remunerate shareholders instead of investing in the service.  
By adopting a DPM approach for this case, we may identify two kind of indicators in 
relation the case under analysis.  
Indicator 1 – Assets: If we want to achieve a certain result in terms of investments (which 
is the flow that foster the strategic resource ‘Assets’) we can build a first performance 
indicator by comparing the actual assets level with a desired level. However the desired assets 
level cannot be a fixed or external variable because it should consider the change in service 
quality caused by the growing number of trips. 
Indicator 2 – Service Quality: It is possible to determine the desired asset level by 
defining another performance indicator which compares the actual service quality with a 
standard one. In this case, standards valid for all the service providers should be defined by 
the public actors regulating the service so as to address citizen expectations. 
Transportation service quality has been framed by Eboli and Mazzulla (2012) into seven 
features that has been explored in the first chapter of this study (service availability, service 
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reliability, fare, comfort and cleanliness, safety and security, information, customer care, 
environmental impacts). 
Therefore, the service quality performance indicator can be split into different indicators 
once a standard for each of them has been identified (i.e. in the Palermo’s case the quality 
indicators that were defined based on the information available concerned service availability 
– extensiveness -, reliability – frequency -, fare - ticket price - and comfort, safety and 
environmental impacts - bus age). 
Identifying performance indicators is a core step if we want to improve the service. 
However it is not sufficient per se. The standards identified and the intermediate results 
achieved must then be shared between the authority and the concessioners. This will allow us 
to design performance oriented policy and to align the objectives, aims and expectations of 
the stakeholders involved in the service provision.  
 
4.4 Discussion and Policy Options 
 
Based on what has been explained previously, the policy designed for this case is about 
creating a feedback process between the service quality and the employment of financial 
resources. Even though the asset level may appear endogenous to the system, shareholders’ 
interests influence the choice between devoting financial resource to dividends or to new 
assets, ‘neutralizing’ the system’s performance feedback. Due to that, it is necessary for the 
authority to regulate the investments that private providers make in assets through a new 
feedback from the system’s performance that may fully ‘endogenize’ the stock of assets.  
At a managerial level, given the subsidies policy of ensuring that ticket prices are blocked 
and that determines a rise in subsidies – due to the inflation growth -, the resource that is 
managed without considering the whole system performance is the asset level. Since the 
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service quality depends by the asset level and the number of users, in order to keep it stable 
(and so to have the end-result ‘change in service quality’ non-negative), the investment in 
assets should counter, not only the depreciation/obsolescence process, but also the negative 
effect of an increase in the number of users on service quality level. 
The resulting overall structure is portrayed in figure 4.8. As we may notice, the model has 
now one more loop (B2) that represents the policy suggested. With this policy the share of 
financial resources to be invested in assets will take into account the service quality level. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Policy option - CLD 
The two kind of Performance Indicators identified for this case (assets and quality) may 
help us in formulate the policy portrayed in the CLD (figure 6) and, therefore, to tackle this 
particular wicked and governance related issue. The feedback we need to add to the model is 
shown in the following diagram. 
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Figure 4.10: Policy option - SFD 
In paragraph 4.3 it was discussed how to determine a service quality indicator. Whenever 
the indicators developed score below 1.00, and the service quality is below the service quality 
target fixed, the desired assets level will be adjusted. In these cases the company will be asked 
to increase the level of assets accordingly to the community expectations expressed as 
performance targets. The desired asset level represents the target used in order to build the 
assets performance indicator which, in the designed policy, has the effect of influencing the 
company investment rate in new assets. If the asset level is below the desired one, the 
company will have to invest in new assets (accordingly to the service quality pitfalls 
identified by the previous kind of indicator). Once the asset level is aligned with the target 
one, it will positively affect the service quality and the community satisfaction. 
By applying this policy, the out-coming simulation results are portrayed in figure 4.10.  
As we may notice starting from the 13th year (156th month), the service quality rapidly 
increases. Therefore such a policy, that only focus on improving the governance rules 
between the actors involved, can have an immediate impact on the service performance.  
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Although the policy designed is specifically addressed at solving a problem at a managerial 
level, not considering other external resources that may be ‘endogenized’ in the system – i.e. 
subsidies -, this case teaches us that sharing performance information perceived by different 
governance levels may help the system to avoid distortions deriving from policy badly 
implemented. The ‘endogenization’ process in the Buenos Aires case concerns the desired 
asset level whose value was determined without any reference with the actual service quality.   
However, from this simulation, it also emerges that the subsidies decision making process 
may be not sustainable for the state financial resources. In fact the exponential growth 
behaviour of subsidies would bring the central government at paying about AR$ 
165.000.000,00 per month to the bus company in 2020.  
 
Figure 4.11: Policy simulation results 
Although the tactical policy proposed results in a better performance for the system, in the 
long run, if not integrated with the strategic level, it may result non-sustainable for the 
government finances. For this reason, the simulation has also been performed by fixing an 
2000                                                                                  2020 
2000                                                                                  2020 
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arbitrary limit for the government expenditure (figure 4.12). We may observe that, in the 
medium term, even with an expenditure limit (the same amount achieved in 2013 – i.e. AR$ 
20.000.000 per month) the switch in behaviour determined by the applied policy does not 
change but only reduces its strength. 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Policy simulation results with expenditures limit 
  
2000                                                                                           2020 
2000                                                                                            2020 
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Chapter 5: Two Case Studies Compared 
 
 
This study focuses on the management of public transportation systems in cities. 
Cities are becoming central in our society. While world population has been growing 
exponentially, in the recent decades more people have moved from rural to urban areas 
(United Nations, 2014). In the last 50 years this global trend has caused a rapid urbanization 
and the sprawling of many urban areas. Nevertheless, not all cities present the same patterns 
of development. Each case is unique and deserves attention.  
The following figure shows the urbanization trend in each world continent. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Urban and rural population as proportion of total population, by mayor areas, 1950-2050 (UN,2014) 
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When studying its transportation system, the main determinants that characterize a city can 
be found in the degree of urbanization of the area, dimensions, institutional settings and 
organizational form of urban transportation.  
Palermo and Buenos Aires are heterogeneous with regards to all the above-mentioned 
features. While Buenos Aires is a growing city that is attracting many people from all over its 
own country and the rest south American, Palermo’s population, after a phase of rapid growth 
in the 1970s is now constant. Buenos Aires, which is the capital city of Argentina, is a 
‘megacity’ in which the population overrun the territorial boundaries and now has about 15 
million inhabitants (considering the neighbouring municipalities). Palermo, which is the fifth 
largest city in Italy and capital city of the Sicilian Region, is a middle-sized urban area whose 
population is about 1 million (considering the neighbouring municipalities). 
Considering these differences, it is not possible to generalize the results here obtained. 
More generally, it is not possible to generalize any result when analysing city mobility since 
every city is unique and has its own specific characteristics. The reason why these two cities 
have been taken into consideration lies in the fact that their heterogeneity allowed us to 
understand how a DPM approach may be adapted to different wicked contexts and frame a 
system, even when several actors are participating.   
 
5.1 A Comparative Chart 
 
In order to help the comparison between the two cases a table has been developed. The 
columns of the table show the cities’ name, while the lines show the main characteristics used 
to compare the cases, namely: organizational form, kind of provider, governance levels, role 
of the authority, population served. 
  
93 
 
 Palermo Buenos Aires 
Organizational form Public network Hybrid form: regulated 
authorization and private 
concession 
Provider Public owned company Private company 
Governance levels 4 3 
Authority role Entrepreneur Watchdog and Subsidiser 
Population served About 700.000 inhabitants About 1.100.000 inhabitants 
 
Table 5.2: A comparative table 
First of all, the organizational forms differ since in the Italian city the service is run 
through an authority initiative that takes the form of a public network; while in the 
Argentinian capital the organizational form has the characteristics of both authority and 
market initiatives. Even though a public network may appear less problematic in determining 
wicked issues coming from fragmentation, the analysis of the Palermo case showed us that 
when various administrations (with unaligned aims and expectations) are involved in the 
service provision, this may still cause unsatisfactory performances. This is particularly true 
when top governance levels interfere in the service management by setting goals and posing 
conflicting constraints (e.g. fixing ticket prices). 
The Palermo’s case study was built around the public owned provider, AMAT. This 
company runs the service in a monopolistic context providing it for the whole city population.  
Even though AMAT is formally a joint stock company, all of its shares are owned by the 
municipality. This ‘public network’ structure helps the system to consider the importance of 
social outcomes. However, the company is required to perform a high quality of service even 
when operating unprofitable routes to guarantee transportation facilities to each group of 
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individuals; also other governance levels – particularly the Municipality of Palermo and the 
Sicilian Region – make AMAT to operate with a decreasing amount of funds, in the pursuit of 
a more efficient service. The result is an inefficient and ineffective transportation service for 
the whole city, demonstrated by the decreasing trends of the performance indicators defined. 
From this brief case description it can be seen how AMAT top managers have to deal with 
three other governance levels, each with different needs. While it is formally a private 
company, it aims at being financially self-sustainable.  
Focusing now on the other case, a more market-oriented initiative is ought to be more 
efficient in term of public expenditure and effective in terms of service quality. However, in 
Argentina the service regulation and the fragmentation of institutions generated distortions, 
resulting in a growing public expenditure and a decreasing service quality offered by the 
private provider. 
In Buenos Aires the analysed provider is a private company that has the same dimensions, 
in term of assets, as AMAT. However in this case the provider operates in a regulated market 
where other companies also run competing services that serve other parts of the urban area.  
In such a structure the company does not feel any pressure in terms of pursuing a social 
outcome. Citizens are customers, and the company aims to make a profit for its shareholders. 
However, the biggest source of revenues (more than 50%) is related to central government 
subsidies. This fact provokes distortions in the company behaviour since it is not encouraged 
to invest in the service so as to raise quality to a certain level through new investment in 
assets.  
In order to take into account these differences and run a comparative analysis, both cases 
have been developed from a micro to a macro perspective. Particularly, the starting point of 
the analysis was the provider’s one. This choice allows us to read the cases adopting the same 
point of view. Also, the ‘micro to macro’ perspective is coherent with the used methodology 
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since it allows us to clearly define the system end-results as perceived by the lower 
governance levels, and then to build a conceptual chain, transversal to the governance 
structure, towards the strategic resources’ identification. 
Framing the system and identifying the resource needed and activated by the provider, was 
useful for having the inter-institutional perspective mentioned in the second chapter. In fact, 
in both cases, identifying the system end-results leads to performance indicators and strategic 
resources definition. Once the resources were framed in the system, an analysis was run so as 
to: a) understand who is controlling each of them; b) understand how the management of each 
resource is related – in a two-way causation perspective - to the system performance. 
From the analysis of both cases it emerged that the systems performance depends on the 
choices of different actors. Even though this situation is not bad in itself, since it allows the 
various actors to make a contribution to the service provision, if the stakeholders do not stay 
constructively engaged, it is unlikely that the capacity to tackle wicked problems can be 
maintained in long term (Weber & Khademian, 2008). Decision-makers that are faced with 
wicked problems should consider collaborative practices among the stakeholders when 
designing their performance management systems, and may find that the presence of multiple 
actors and perspectives provides a strong environment for this critical approach (Putansu, 
2015). 
Governance fragmentation emerged clearly in both cases once the systems had been 
framed through the DPM approach. Many strategic resources identified were seen to be 
managed without receiving any feedback or information from the system performance; or, as 
happens in the Argentinian case, the influence of a major stakeholder disturbs the normal 
functioning of the system. In fact, in this case, even though the company resources appeared 
to be endogenous in the system, the contract between the provider and the central government 
created distortions which have a negative impact on the service quality.  
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In order to enhance coordination between different governance players, and to solve the 
dynamic problems which characterize the two systems, a process of ‘endogenization’ was 
tested. Thanks to ‘endogenization’, strategic resources that do not receive any performance 
feedback (because they are under the control of a different stakeholder) were connected 
through a causal link with the systems’ end-results. These structural changes are based on 
communication and information exchanges between stakeholders owning strategic resources 
and stakeholders experiencing the overall system performance (Noto & Bianchi, 2015). 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to make a contribution to the field of wicked 
problems related to fragmented governance, with particular reference to urban transportation 
systems. 
Multi-level governances are characterized by the interplay of different actors in a 
production/provision process. In a multi-level governance structure various stakeholders 
influence the system, since they control one or more of its specific strategic resources. 
The problems that arise in these kinds of structures are related to the different goals, 
interests and values that these stakeholders have with regard to the end product or service. 
This situation not only leads to contradiction and tension between different policies and action 
programs, but primarily prevents stakeholders from agreeing on the definition of problems. 
The first chapter introduced us to the topic, discussing the current state of wicked problems 
studies, and multi-level governance in the public sector. Having retraced the last 40 years of 
public management reforms it was necessary to understand the causes and the fertile context 
in which wickedness emerges.  
The introduction of performance management, privatization and decentralization 
determined a new and more efficient approach to performing public services; however it also 
enhanced governance fragmentation and ‘silos mentality’, which, together with pluralism and 
uncertainty, are the causes of the rise of wicked problems.  
Urban transportation did not escape the waves of public management reform. However, 
their actual implementation varies across countries on the basis of different political, cultural 
and environmental factors.  
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What emerged from the literature analysis is that the most successful way of overcoming 
the distortions caused by governance fragmentation is to enhance coordination and 
collaboration between the different governance levels participating in the creation of public 
value.  
In order to do this, a systematic approach is strongly recommended. This would allow us to 
focus on the ‘big picture’ of the transportation systems. Literature suggests that we adopt 
methods that allow the analyst to deal with complexity. The research methodology hereby 
adopted is Dynamic Performance Management. This approach allowed us to understand who 
the governing players are, what their roles are, and how they influence the production and 
provision processes. DPM merges Performance Management Theory with System Dynamics. 
While the PM framework helped the analysist adopt the perspective of Public Administrations 
studies; SD allows the analyst to simulate the behaviour of a certain system over time. 
Given that, it is important to underline that SD does not have a predictive power. 
Simulation value as a scientific method lies mainly in three features (Axelrod, 1997): 
prediction (or forecasting), existence proof, and discovery (of new structures). However, in 
social sciences such as management, simulation value lies also in its education and training 
features. In this thesis, simulation has mainly been used as a tool for testing models’ 
structures, forecasting systems’ behaviours, analysing scenarios and testing policies. 
DPM resulted to be an outstanding tool for framing urban transportation systems so as to 
outline results and resources involved. Furthermore it allows us to think strategically about 
what information needs to be shared in the system in order to foster coordination between 
stakeholders and network logics. 
In order to answer the research questions of this study, two case studies of two 
municipalities were developed: Palermo (Italy) and Buenos Aires (Argentina). Even though 
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the two case studies were based on two cities with different social characteristics, the 
conclusions obtained from their analysis are similar.  
In both cases it was seen that the transportation system performance was influenced by 
several actors with different values, aims and resources. Building a set of performance 
indicators helps the analyst to focus attention on the performance levers, so as to understand 
how the employment of the system resources impacts on the service provision. Furthermore, 
by focusing on the strategic resources on which the indicators depend, we can identify those 
who manage them, and how the decision-making process regarding each resource is run. 
When a strategic resource is managed as an external input to the transportation system, its 
‘endogenization’ has been proved to be a ‘good enough’ solution to overcome the external 
interference on the system, deriving from governance issues (contracts, prevailing interests, 
etc.). 
 
Limitations and future perspectives 
 
One limitation to this study could derive from the research methodology which takes 
advantage of a modelling tool. As “all models are wrong” (Sterman, 2002), in the sense that 
our knowledge about complex systems is limited and we need to simplify our models in order 
to represent the complexity within them, we need to distinguish between the model and the 
reality it attempts to represent. Even though the models here developed are ‘wrong’, in the 
sense that a model cannot represent all the details present in the real world, their usefulness 
comes from their helping us understand the main causal relationships that form the systems’ 
structure. With the aid of the models, a set of performance indicators that help us to 
understand the impact of the governing structure on the system’s performance was created. 
These indicators can inform stakeholders about how the system works (how end-results are 
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achieved), allowing them to develop shared understanding and meaning about any problems 
that arise. The indicators helped us in reforming the systems through improved coordination 
of the actors involved in governing it, thus reducing the wickedness of the production process. 
Overall, the models can be used as a tool for engagement and communication with other 
levels of governance. 
Even though the approach used takes in all the three level of PM systems – namely, 
strategic, tactical and operational - another limitation of this study could be due to the fact that 
the policy solutions proposed are only focused on the tactical level of PM systems. Briefly, 
transportation strategies and goals that emerged from the analysis were considered as given, 
and the policy options were focused on finding a ‘good enough’ way to pursue them. This 
limit emerged more clearly in the Buenos Aires case, where simulation showed that an 
exclusive focus on the tactical level would determine a non-sustainable policy at the strategic 
level. A further development of this work may also consider the possibility of including the 
strategy formulation/revision process.  
This work focused very much on the conceptual understanding of how coordination may 
help when multi-level governance settings have a negative influence on the system’s 
performance. In particular some policy options were identified for specific cases. However, 
no practical solutions are provided within the frame of this dissertation. It does not emerge 
who has to implement the identified policies and how one actor may obtain legitimacy for 
intervening in the system decision-making process, even if only for coordination purposes. 
This issue represents an opportunity for further development of the current study. Some 
authors concerned with this topic (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Acuto, 2012) suggest adopting 
a ‘meta-governor’ for fostering coordination and avoiding the risk of ducking responsibility.  
It is also due to mention the data gap for what concern the Argentinian case. In fact, it was 
not possible to have access to many of the data regarding the internal structure of the private 
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company analysed due to privacy concerns. However, thanks to the experts interviews and the 
available data it was possible to build a useful and valid simulation model even for this case.  
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Appendix A (Palermo’s model) 
Palermo’s model equations with no policies:  
 
Administrative_Staff(t) = Administrative_Staff(t - dt) + (Adm_Hiring - Adm_Attrition) * dt 
INIT Administrative_Staff = 209 
INFLOWS: 
Adm_Hiring = Adm_Hiring_Rate*Administrative_Staff 
OUTFLOWS: 
Adm_Attrition =  Administrative_Staff*Adm_Attr_rate 
Assets(t) = Assets(t - dt) + (Increase_in_assets - Depreciation - Disinvestments) * dt 
INIT Assets = 48025183 
INFLOWS: 
Increase_in_assets = 
Assets*Investment_rate/Year*0+Cash_Inflow/10*0+(4700000+Cash/10) 
OUTFLOWS: 
Depreciation = Assets*Depreciation_rate/Year 
Disinvestments = Assets*Disinvestment_Rate*Cash_proportion_from_disinvestments/Year 
Avg_Bus_Speed(t) = Avg_Bus_Speed(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Speed) * dt 
INIT Avg_Bus_Speed = 13.99 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Speed = (Effect_of_PT_on_Avg_Speed-Avg_Bus_Speed)/Time_for_PT_to_impact 
Buses_0_to_5_yr(t) = Buses_0_to_5_yr(t - dt) + (Bus_Purchase_rate - ageing_rate) * dt 
INIT Buses_0_to_5_yr = 120 
INFLOWS: 
Bus_Purchase_rate = Funds_per_Buses/Cost_per_Bus 
OUTFLOWS: 
ageing_rate = Buses_0_to_5_yr/Ageing_time 
Buses_5_to_10_yr(t) = Buses_5_to_10_yr(t - dt) + (ageing_rate - ageing_rate_2) * dt 
INIT Buses_5_to_10_yr = 130 
INFLOWS: 
ageing_rate = Buses_0_to_5_yr/Ageing_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
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ageing_rate_2 = Buses_5_to_10_yr/Ageing_time 
Bus_over_10_yr(t) = Bus_over_10_yr(t - dt) + (ageing_rate_2 - Bus_disposal) * dt 
INIT Bus_over_10_yr = 250 
INFLOWS: 
ageing_rate_2 = Buses_5_to_10_yr/Ageing_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Bus_disposal = Bus_over_10_yr/Disposal_time 
Cash(t) = Cash(t - dt) + (Cash_Inflow + Disinvestments - Cash_outflow - Increase_in_assets) 
* dt 
INIT Cash = 2070812 
INFLOWS: 
Cash_Inflow = Collected_revenues+(if Chg_in_Equity>0 then Chg_in_Equity else 0)+(if 
Change__in_debt>0 then Change__in_debt else 0) 
Disinvestments = Assets*Disinvestment_Rate*Cash_proportion_from_disinvestments/Year 
OUTFLOWS: 
Cash_outflow = Payed_Expenses-(if Chg_in_Equity<0 then Chg_in_Equity else 0)+(if 
Change__in_debt<0 then Change__in_debt else 0) 
Increase_in_assets = 
Assets*Investment_rate/Year*0+Cash_Inflow/10*0+(4700000+Cash/10) 
Equity(t) = Equity(t - dt) + (Net_Income - Chg_in_Equity) * dt 
INIT Equity = 91719133 
INFLOWS: 
Net_Income = Revenues-Expenses 
OUTFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Equity = 0 
Mainteinance_Staff(t) = Mainteinance_Staff(t - dt) + (Maint_Hiring - Maint_Attrition) * dt 
INIT Mainteinance_Staff = 328 
INFLOWS: 
Maint_Hiring = Maint_Hiring_Rate*Mainteinance_Staff 
OUTFLOWS: 
Maint_Attrition = Maint_Attr_rate*Mainteinance_Staff 
N_of_Lines(t) = N_of_Lines(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Lines) * dt 
INIT N_of_Lines = 91 
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INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Lines = 0 
Private_Transportation(t) = Private_Transportation(t - dt) + (Chg_in_PT) * dt 
INIT Private_Transportation = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_PT = (Effect_of_Service_on__Private_Transportation-
Private_Transportation)/Time_to_affect_Private_Transportation 
Quality_of_Service(t) = Quality_of_Service(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Quality) * dt 
INIT Quality_of_Service = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Quality = ((Frequency_P_Driver+Lines_P_Driver+Timeliness_P_driver)/3-
Quality_of_Service)/Time_to_impact_on_quality 
Seasonal_Ticket(t) = Seasonal_Ticket(t - dt) + (Chg_in_ST) * dt 
INIT Seasonal_Ticket = 4506 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_ST = (Combined_effect_on_S_ticket_sales*Seasonal_Ticket-Seasonal_Ticket)/Year 
Tickets(t) = Tickets(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Tickets) * dt 
INIT Tickets = 8158012 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Tickets = (Combined_effect_on_ticket_sales*Tickets-Tickets)/Year 
Customer_Satisfaction(t) = Customer_Satisfaction(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Cust_Sat) * dt 
INIT Customer_Satisfaction = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Cust_Sat = (Quality_of_Service-
Customer_Satisfaction)/Time_to_perceive_chg_in_Quality 
Debt(t) = Debt(t - dt) + (Change__in_debt) * dt 
INIT Debt = 112684331 
INFLOWS: 
Change__in_debt = -Cash/Time_to_perceive_fin_position+Debt_rate*Debt*0 
Drivers(t) = Drivers(t - dt) + (Drivers_Hiring - Drivers_Atttrition) * dt 
INIT Drivers = 1237 
INFLOWS: 
Drivers_Hiring = Driv_Hiring_Rate*Drivers 
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OUTFLOWS: 
Drivers_Atttrition =  Drivers*Driv_Attr_rate 
Frequence(t) = Frequence(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Frequence) * dt 
INIT Frequence = 31078 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Frequence = IF Effect_of_Drivers__on_Frequence=0 THEN Extreme_case ELSE IF 
Total_nr_of_Buses=0 THEN Extreme_case ELSE 
((Effect_of_Buses_on_Frequence*0.4+Effect_of_Drivers__on_Frequence*0.4+Effect_of_Av
g_Speed_on_Frequence*0.2)-Frequence)/Time_to_impact_on_frequence 
Nr_of_Km_Traveled(t) = Nr_of_Km_Traveled(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Km_Trav) * dt 
INIT Nr_of_Km_Traveled = 21012982 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Km_Trav = (Frequence*N_of_Lines*Avg_route_leght*Year)-Nr_of_Km_Traveled 
Regional_Service_Contracts(t) = Regional_Service_Contracts(t - dt) + (Chg_in_RSC) * dt 
INIT Regional_Service_Contracts = 56077317 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_RSC = ((Effect_of_KM_Driver_on_RSC*Contract_change)-
Regional_Service_Contracts)/TIme_to_adjust_RSC 
Route_loss_perc(t) = Route_loss_perc(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Timeliness) * dt 
INIT Route_loss_perc = 0.17 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Timeliness = 
((Effect_of_Drivers_on___Timeliness+Effect_of_Buses_on___Timeliness+Effect_of_Traffic
_on_Timeliness)/3-Route_loss_perc)/Year 
Ticket_Price_level(t) = Ticket_Price_level(t - dt) 
INIT Ticket_Price_level = 1.2 
Adm_Attr_rate = 0.198 
Adm_cost = Administrative_Staff*Avg_Wage_Adm 
Adm_Hiring_Rate = 0 
Ageing_time = 5 
Avg_Bus_Age = 
((Buses_5_to_10_yr*Ageing_time)+(Buses_0_to_5_yr*Ageing_time)+(Bus_over_10_yr*Dis
posal_time))/Total_nr_of_Buses 
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Avg_Bus_Age_benchmark = 10 
Avg_consumption_of_fuel = 3*0.85+5*0.15 
Avg_Price_of_Fuel = Price_of_Gasoline*0.85+Price_of_Methane*0.15 
Avg_route_leght = 7.43 
Avg_Wage_Adm = 80000 
Avg_Wage_driv = 30000 
Avg_Wage_Maint = 35000 
Bus_age_Driver = Avg_Bus_Age/Avg_Bus_Age_benchmark 
Cash_proportion_from_disinvestments = 0.2 
Collected_revenues = Revenues/Collection_rate 
Collection_rate = 2 
Combined_effect_on_S_ticket_sales = 
Weighted_Effect_of_Price_on_S_tickets*Weighted_Effect_of_Customer_Sat_on_S_tickets 
Combined_effect_on_ticket_sales = 
Effect_of_price_on_tickets*Effect_of_Customer_Satisfaction_on_Ticket_sales 
Contract_change = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 1.00), (2010, 1.00), (2011, 1.00), (2012, 0.8) 
Cost_of_manteinance = 
Effect_of_Bus_age_on_raw_material_acquisition/2+Effect_of_Nr_Bus_on_Maintenance/2 
Cost_per_Bus = 80000 
Cost_per_KM = Expenses/Nr_of_Km_Traveled 
Debt_rate = -0.051 
Depreciation_rate = 0.15 
Desired_Frequency = 31000 
Desired_Nr_of_Km_Traveled = 19000000 
Desired_N_of_Lines = 91 
Disinvestment_Rate = 0.0122 
Disposal_time = 12 
Drivers_cost = Drivers*Avg_Wage_driv 
Driv_Attr_rate = 0.0416 
Driv_Hiring_Rate = 0.0153 
Effect_of_Avg_Speed_on_Frequence = GRAPH(Avg_Bus_Speed) 
(10.0, 9000), (11.3, 16000), (12.7, 23000), (14.0, 31000) 
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Effect_of_Buses_on_Frequence = GRAPH(Total_nr_of_Buses) 
(400, 24256), (425, 25235), (450, 26323), (475, 28281), (500, 30456) 
Effect_of_Buses_on___Timeliness = GRAPH(Total_nr_of_Buses) 
(480, 0.25), (487, 0.22), (493, 0.2), (500, 0.17) 
Effect_of_Bus_age_on_raw_material_acquisition = GRAPH(Bus_age_Driver) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.222, 2e+006), (0.444, 4e+006), (0.667, 5.4e+006), (0.889, 6e+006), (1.11, 
8e+006), (1.33, 1e+007), (1.56, 1.1e+007), (1.78, 1.1e+007), (2.00, 1.1e+007) 
Effect_of_Customer_Satisfaction_on_Ticket_sales = GRAPH(Customer_Satisfaction) 
(0.00, 0.751), (0.0579, 0.814), (0.116, 0.842), (0.174, 0.87), (0.232, 0.905), (0.289, 0.93), 
(0.347, 0.935), (0.405, 0.94), (0.463, 0.945), (0.521, 0.95), (0.579, 0.955), (0.637, 0.96), 
(0.695, 0.965), (0.753, 0.97), (0.811, 0.975), (0.868, 0.98), (0.926, 0.999), (0.984, 1.00), 
(1.04, 1.04), (1.10, 1.01) 
Effect_of_Drivers_on___Timeliness = GRAPH(Drivers) 
(1090, 0.25), (1139, 0.22), (1188, 0.2), (1237, 0.17) 
Effect_of_Drivers__on_Frequence = GRAPH(Drivers) 
(0.00, 0.00), (124, 6535), (248, 12845), (372, 17127), (496, 22986), (620, 25912), (744, 
26208), (868, 26380), (992, 26627), (1116, 26824), (1240, 27120) 
Effect_of_KM_Driver_on_RSC = GRAPH(KM_Travelled_Driver) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.5, 9.5e+006), (1.00, 4.8e+007), (1.50, 8e+007), (2.00, 8e+007) 
Effect_of_Nr_Bus_on_Maintenance = GRAPH(Total_nr_of_Buses) 
(0.00, 0.00), (167, 3e+006), (333, 4e+006), (500, 5.4e+006) 
Effect_of_price_on_S_ticket = GRAPH(ST_Price_Driver) 
(0.00, 1.50), (0.5, 1.10), (1.00, 1.00), (1.50, 0.9), (2.00, 0.7) 
Effect_of_price_on_tickets = GRAPH(Ticket_Price_Driver) 
(0.00, 1.41), (0.333, 1.24), (0.667, 1.09), (1.00, 0.989), (1.33, 0.925), (1.67, 0.807), (2.00, 
0.702), (2.33, 0.632), (2.67, 0.554), (3.00, 0.519) 
Effect_of_PT_on_Avg_Speed = GRAPH(Private_Transportation) 
(0.00, 15.0), (0.667, 14.0), (1.33, 13.5), (2.00, 12.5) 
Effect_of_Service_on__Private_Transportation = GRAPH(Quality_of_Service) 
(0.00, 4.00), (0.5, 2.00), (1.00, 1.00), (1.50, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00) 
Effect_of_Traffic_on_Timeliness = GRAPH(Avg_Bus_Speed) 
(13.9, 0.28), (13.9, 0.25), (13.9, 0.22), (14.0, 0.17) 
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Expenses = 
Cost_of_manteinance+Gasoline_per_year+Total_Personnel_cost+Depreciation+Leftover+Ot
her_Expenses+Financial_Costs 
Extreme_case = -90000 
Financial_Costs = Debt*0.02/Year 
FInancial_Cost_Indicator = Financial_Costs/Expenses 
Frequence_per_route_per_year = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 31078), (2010, 28993), (2011, 26049), (2012, 25296) 
Frequency_P_Driver = Frequence/Desired_Frequency 
Funds_per_Buses = Increase_in_assets*Percentage_of_Bus_on_Tot_Investment 
Gasoline_per_year = Avg_Price_of_Fuel*Nr_of_Km_Traveled/Avg_consumption_of_fuel 
Investment_rate = 0.098 
KM_Travelled_Driver = Nr_of_Km_Traveled/Desired_Nr_of_Km_Traveled 
Leftover = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, -4.1e+005), (2010, 425512), (2011, 109374), (2012, 104633) 
Lines_performance_indicator = Regional_Service_Contracts/N_of_Lines 
Lines_P_Driver = N_of_Lines/Desired_N_of_Lines 
Maint_Attr_rate = 0.057 
Maint_cost = Mainteinance_Staff*Avg_Wage_Maint 
Maint_Hiring_Rate = 0 
Municipality_Service_Contract = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 2.7e+007), (2010, 2.4e+007), (2011, 2.4e+007), (2012, 2.4e+007) 
Other_Expenses = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 1.7e+007), (2010, 1.8e+007), (2011, 1.8e+007), (2012, 1.9e+007) 
Other_Revenues = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 2.1e+006), (2010, 2.1e+006), (2011, 2.1e+006), (2012, 2.1e+006) 
Payed_Expenses = (Expenses/Payment_rate)-Leftover-Depreciation 
Payment_rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 1.57), (2010, 2.07), (2011, 1.97), (2012, 2.78) 
Percentage_of_Bus_on_Tot_Investment = 0.3 
Price_of_Gasoline = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 1.40), (2012, 1.90) 
Price_of_Methane = 1 
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Reference_cash = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 2.1e+006), (2010, 85875), (2011, 59464), (2012, 215754) 
Reference_Net_Income = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, -6.9e+006), (2010, -8.1e+006), (2011, -7.7e+006), (2012, -1.3e+007) 
Revenues =  
Regional_Service_Contracts+Revenues_from_Tickets+Other_Revenues+Municipality_Servic
e_Contract 
Revenues_from_Tickets = (Ticket_Price_level*Tickets)+(Seasonal_Ticket*ST_avg_Price) 
ST_avg_Price = 576 
ST_Price_Benchmark = 550 
ST_Price_Driver = ST_avg_Price/ST_Price_Benchmark 
Ticket_Price_Benchmark = 1 
Ticket_Price_Driver = Ticket_Price_level/Ticket_Price_Benchmark 
Timeliness_P_driver = 1-Route_loss_perc 
Time_for_PT_to_impact = 0.5 
TIme_to_adjust_RSC = 1 
Time_to_affect_Private_Transportation = 0.5 
Time_to_impact_on_frequence = 0.2 
Time_to_impact_on_quality = 0.5 
Time_to_perceive_chg_in_Quality = 0.5 
Time_to_perceive_fin_position = 0.5 
Total_nr_of_Buses = Buses_0_to_5_yr+Buses_5_to_10_yr+Bus_over_10_yr 
Total_Personnel_cost = Drivers_cost+Adm_cost+Maint_cost 
Total_Staff = Drivers+Administrative_Staff+Mainteinance_Staff 
Weighted_Effect_of_Customer_Sat_on_S_tickets = 
Effect_of_Customer_Satisfaction_on_Ticket_sales*2 
Weighted_Effect_of_Price_on_S_tickets = Effect_of_price_on_S_ticket/2 
Year = 1 
 
Palermo’s model structure with no policies: 
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Palermo’s model equations with policies:  
 
Administrative_Staff(t) = Administrative_Staff(t - dt) + (Adm_Hiring - Adm_Attrition) * dt 
INIT Administrative_Staff = 209 
INFLOWS: 
Adm_Hiring = Adm_Hiring_Rate*Administrative_Staff 
OUTFLOWS: 
Adm_Attrition =  Administrative_Staff*Adm_Attr_rate 
Assets(t) = Assets(t - dt) + (Increase_in_assets - Depreciation - Disinvestments) * dt 
INIT Assets = 48025183 
INFLOWS: 
Increase_in_assets = 
Assets*Investment_rate/Year*0+Cash_Inflow/10*0+(4700000+Cash/10) 
OUTFLOWS: 
Depreciation = Assets*Depreciation_rate/Year 
Disinvestments = Assets*Disinvestment_Rate*Cash_proportion_from_disinvestments/Year 
Avg_Bus_Speed(t) = Avg_Bus_Speed(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Speed) * dt 
INIT Avg_Bus_Speed = 13.99 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Speed = (Effect_of_PT_on_Avg_Speed-Avg_Bus_Speed)/Time_for_PT_to_impact 
Buses_0_to_5_yr(t) = Buses_0_to_5_yr(t - dt) + (Bus_Purchase_rate - ageing_rate) * dt 
INIT Buses_0_to_5_yr = 120 
INFLOWS: 
Bus_Purchase_rate = Funds_per_Buses/Cost_per_Bus 
OUTFLOWS: 
ageing_rate = Buses_0_to_5_yr/Ageing_time 
Buses_5_to_10_yr(t) = Buses_5_to_10_yr(t - dt) + (ageing_rate - ageing_rate_2) * dt 
INIT Buses_5_to_10_yr = 130 
INFLOWS: 
ageing_rate = Buses_0_to_5_yr/Ageing_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
ageing_rate_2 = Buses_5_to_10_yr/Ageing_time 
Bus_over_10_yr(t) = Bus_over_10_yr(t - dt) + (ageing_rate_2 - Bus_disposal) * dt 
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INIT Bus_over_10_yr = 250 
INFLOWS: 
ageing_rate_2 = Buses_5_to_10_yr/Ageing_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Bus_disposal = Bus_over_10_yr/Disposal_time 
Cash(t) = Cash(t - dt) + (Cash_Inflow + Disinvestments - Cash_outflow - Increase_in_assets) 
* dt 
INIT Cash = 2070812 
INFLOWS: 
Cash_Inflow = Collected_revenues+(if Chg_in_Equity>0 then Chg_in_Equity else 0)+(if 
Change__in_debt>0 then Change__in_debt else 0) 
Disinvestments = Assets*Disinvestment_Rate*Cash_proportion_from_disinvestments/Year 
OUTFLOWS: 
Cash_outflow = Payed_Expenses-(if Chg_in_Equity<0 then Chg_in_Equity else 0)+(if 
Change__in_debt<0 then Change__in_debt else 0) 
Increase_in_assets = 
Assets*Investment_rate/Year*0+Cash_Inflow/10*0+(4700000+Cash/10) 
Equity(t) = Equity(t - dt) + (Net_Income - Chg_in_Equity) * dt 
INIT Equity = 91719133 
INFLOWS: 
Net_Income = Revenues-Expenses 
OUTFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Equity = 0 
Mainteinance_Staff(t) = Mainteinance_Staff(t - dt) + (Maint_Hiring - Maint_Attrition) * dt 
INIT Mainteinance_Staff = 328 
INFLOWS: 
Maint_Hiring = Maint_Hiring_Rate*Mainteinance_Staff 
OUTFLOWS: 
Maint_Attrition = Maint_Attr_rate*Mainteinance_Staff 
N_of_Lines(t) = N_of_Lines(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Lines) * dt 
INIT N_of_Lines = 91 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Lines = 0 
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Private_Transportation(t) = Private_Transportation(t - dt) + (Chg_in_PT) * dt 
INIT Private_Transportation = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_PT = (Effect_of_Service_on__Private_Transportation-
Private_Transportation)/Time_to_affect_Private_Transportation 
Quality_of_Service(t) = Quality_of_Service(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Quality) * dt 
INIT Quality_of_Service = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Quality = ((Frequency_P_Driver+Lines_P_Driver+Timeliness_P_driver)/3-
Quality_of_Service)/Time_to_impact_on_quality 
Seasonal_Ticket(t) = Seasonal_Ticket(t - dt) + (Chg_in_ST) * dt 
INIT Seasonal_Ticket = 4506 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_ST = (Combined_effect_on_S_ticket_sales*Seasonal_Ticket-Seasonal_Ticket)/Year 
Tickets(t) = Tickets(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Tickets) * dt 
INIT Tickets = 8158012 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Tickets = (Combined_effect_on_ticket_sales*Tickets-Tickets)/Year 
Customer_Satisfaction(t) = Customer_Satisfaction(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Cust_Sat) * dt 
INIT Customer_Satisfaction = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Cust_Sat = (Quality_of_Service-
Customer_Satisfaction)/Time_to_perceive_chg_in_Quality 
Debt(t) = Debt(t - dt) + (Change__in_debt) * dt 
INIT Debt = 112684331 
INFLOWS: 
Change__in_debt = -Cash/Time_to_perceive_fin_position+Debt_rate*Debt*0 
Drivers(t) = Drivers(t - dt) + (Drivers_Hiring - Drivers_Atttrition) * dt 
INIT Drivers = 1237 
INFLOWS: 
Drivers_Hiring = Driv_Hiring_Rate*Drivers 
OUTFLOWS: 
Drivers_Atttrition =  Drivers*Driv_Attr_rate 
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Frequence(t) = Frequence(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Frequence) * dt 
INIT Frequence = 31078 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Frequence = IF Effect_of_Drivers__on_Frequence=0 THEN Extreme_case ELSE IF 
Total_nr_of_Buses=0 THEN Extreme_case ELSE 
((Effect_of_Buses_on_Frequence*0.4+Effect_of_Drivers__on_Frequence*0.4+Effect_of_Av
g_Speed_on_Frequence*0.2)-Frequence)/Time_to_impact_on_frequence 
Municipal_Contract_Service(t) = Municipal_Contract_Service(t - dt) + (Chg_in_MCS) * dt 
INIT Municipal_Contract_Service = 27312615 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_MCS = if time<2012 then (Municipality_Service_Contract-
Municipal_Contract_Service)/Year else MIN ((MAX_Municipal_CS-
Municipal_Contract_Service)/Year, (Municipal_Contract_Service*(2-Bus_age_Driver)-
Municipal_Contract_Service)/Year) 
Nr_of_Km_Traveled(t) = Nr_of_Km_Traveled(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Km_Trav) * dt 
INIT Nr_of_Km_Traveled = 21012982 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Km_Trav = (Frequence*N_of_Lines*Avg_route_leght*Year)-Nr_of_Km_Traveled 
Regional_Service_Contracts(t) = Regional_Service_Contracts(t - dt) + (Chg_in_RSC) * dt 
INIT Regional_Service_Contracts = 56077317 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_RSC = ((Effect_of_KM_Driver_on_RSC*Contract_change)-
Regional_Service_Contracts)/TIme_to_adjust_RSC 
Route_loss_perc(t) = Route_loss_perc(t - dt) + (Chg_in_Timeliness) * dt 
INIT Route_loss_perc = 0.17 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_Timeliness = 
((Effect_of_Drivers_on___Timeliness+Effect_of_Buses_on___Timeliness+Effect_of_Traffic
_on_Timeliness)/3-Route_loss_perc)/Year 
Ticket_Price_level(t) = Ticket_Price_level(t - dt) + (Chg_in_ticket_price) * dt 
INIT Ticket_Price_level = 1.2 
INFLOWS: 
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Chg_in_ticket_price = if time<2012 then (Ticket_Price-Ticket_Price_level)/Year else 
(Effect_of_NT_on_TP-Ticket_Price_level)/Year 
Adm_Attr_rate = 0.198 
Adm_cost = Administrative_Staff*Avg_Wage_Adm 
Adm_Hiring_Rate = 0 
Ageing_time = 5 
Avg_Bus_Age = 
((Buses_5_to_10_yr*Ageing_time)+(Buses_0_to_5_yr*Ageing_time)+(Bus_over_10_yr*Dis
posal_time))/Total_nr_of_Buses 
Avg_Bus_Age_benchmark = 10 
Avg_consumption_of_fuel = 3*0.85+5*0.15 
Avg_Price_of_Fuel = Price_of_Gasoline*0.85+Price_of_Methane*0.15 
Avg_route_leght = 7.43 
Avg_Wage_Adm = 80000 
Avg_Wage_driv = 30000 
Avg_Wage_Maint = 35000 
Bus_age_Driver = Avg_Bus_Age/Avg_Bus_Age_benchmark 
Cash_proportion_from_disinvestments = 0.2 
Collected_revenues = Revenues/Collection_rate 
Collection_rate = 2 
Combined_effect_on_S_ticket_sales = 
Weighted_Effect_of_Price_on_S_tickets*Weighted_Effect_of_Customer_Sat_on_S_tickets 
Combined_effect_on_ticket_sales = 
Effect_of_price_on_tickets*Effect_of_Customer_Satisfaction_on_Ticket_sales 
Contract_change = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 1.00), (2010, 1.00), (2011, 1.00), (2012, 0.8) 
Cost_of_manteinance = 
Effect_of_Bus_age_on_raw_material_acquisition/2+Effect_of_Nr_Bus_on_Maintenance/2 
Cost_per_Bus = 80000 
Cost_per_KM = Expenses/Nr_of_Km_Traveled 
Debt_rate = -0.051 
Depreciation_rate = 0.15 
Desired_Frequency = 31000 
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Desired_Nr_of_Km_Traveled = 19000000 
Desired_N_of_Lines = 91 
Disinvestment_Rate = 0.0122 
Disposal_time = 12 
Drivers_cost = Drivers*Avg_Wage_driv 
Driv_Attr_rate = 0.0416 
Driv_Hiring_Rate = 0.0153 
Effect_of_Avg_Speed_on_Frequence = GRAPH(Avg_Bus_Speed) 
(10.0, 9000), (11.3, 16000), (12.7, 23000), (14.0, 31000) 
Effect_of_Buses_on_Frequence = GRAPH(Total_nr_of_Buses) 
(400, 24256), (425, 25235), (450, 26323), (475, 28281), (500, 30456) 
Effect_of_Buses_on___Timeliness = GRAPH(Total_nr_of_Buses) 
(480, 0.25), (487, 0.22), (493, 0.2), (500, 0.17) 
Effect_of_Bus_age_on_raw_material_acquisition = GRAPH(Bus_age_Driver) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.222, 2e+006), (0.444, 4e+006), (0.667, 5.4e+006), (0.889, 6e+006), (1.11, 
8e+006), (1.33, 1e+007), (1.56, 1.1e+007), (1.78, 1.1e+007), (2.00, 1.1e+007) 
Effect_of_Customer_Satisfaction_on_Ticket_sales = GRAPH(Customer_Satisfaction) 
(0.00, 0.751), (0.0579, 0.814), (0.116, 0.842), (0.174, 0.87), (0.232, 0.905), (0.289, 0.93), 
(0.347, 0.935), (0.405, 0.94), (0.463, 0.945), (0.521, 0.95), (0.579, 0.955), (0.637, 0.96), 
(0.695, 0.965), (0.753, 0.97), (0.811, 0.975), (0.868, 0.98), (0.926, 0.999), (0.984, 1.00), 
(1.04, 1.04), (1.10, 1.01) 
Effect_of_Drivers_on___Timeliness = GRAPH(Drivers) 
(1090, 0.25), (1139, 0.22), (1188, 0.2), (1237, 0.17) 
Effect_of_Drivers__on_Frequence = GRAPH(Drivers) 
(0.00, 0.00), (124, 6535), (248, 12845), (372, 17127), (496, 22986), (620, 25912), (744, 
26208), (868, 26380), (992, 26627), (1116, 26824), (1240, 27120) 
Effect_of_KM_Driver_on_RSC = GRAPH(KM_Travelled_Driver) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.5, 9.5e+006), (1.00, 4.8e+007), (1.50, 8e+007), (2.00, 8e+007) 
Effect_of_Nr_Bus_on_Maintenance = GRAPH(Total_nr_of_Buses) 
(0.00, 0.00), (167, 3e+006), (333, 4e+006), (500, 5.4e+006) 
Effect_of_NT_on_TP = GRAPH(Tickets) 
(0.00, 1.02), (700000, 1.02), (1.4e+006, 1.02), (2.1e+006, 1.02), (2.8e+006, 1.02), (3.5e+006, 
1.03), (4.2e+006, 1.06), (4.9e+006, 1.08), (5.6e+006, 1.14), (6.3e+006, 1.21), (7e+006, 1.27) 
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Effect_of_price_on_S_ticket = GRAPH(ST_Price_Driver) 
(0.00, 1.50), (0.5, 1.10), (1.00, 1.00), (1.50, 0.9), (2.00, 0.7) 
Effect_of_price_on_tickets = GRAPH(Ticket_Price_Driver) 
(0.00, 1.41), (0.333, 1.24), (0.667, 1.09), (1.00, 0.989), (1.33, 0.925), (1.67, 0.807), (2.00, 
0.702), (2.33, 0.632), (2.67, 0.554), (3.00, 0.519) 
Effect_of_PT_on_Avg_Speed = GRAPH(Private_Transportation) 
(0.00, 15.0), (0.667, 14.0), (1.33, 13.5), (2.00, 12.5) 
Effect_of_Service_on__Private_Transportation = GRAPH(Quality_of_Service) 
(0.00, 4.00), (0.5, 2.00), (1.00, 1.00), (1.50, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00) 
Effect_of_Traffic_on_Timeliness = GRAPH(Avg_Bus_Speed) 
(13.9, 0.28), (13.9, 0.25), (13.9, 0.22), (14.0, 0.17) 
Expenses = 
Cost_of_manteinance+Gasoline_per_year+Total_Personnel_cost+Depreciation+Leftover+Ot
her_Expenses+Financial_Costs 
Extreme_case = -90000 
Financial_Costs = Debt*0.02/Year 
FInancial_Cost_Indicator = Financial_Costs/Expenses 
Frequency_P_Driver = Frequence/Desired_Frequency 
Funds_per_Buses = Increase_in_assets*Percentage_of_Bus_on_Tot_Investment 
Gasoline_per_year = Avg_Price_of_Fuel*Nr_of_Km_Traveled/Avg_consumption_of_fuel 
Investment_rate = 0.098 
KM_Travelled_Driver = Nr_of_Km_Traveled/Desired_Nr_of_Km_Traveled 
Leftover = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, -4.1e+005), (2010, 425512), (2011, 109374), (2012, 104633) 
Lines_performance_indicator = Regional_Service_Contracts/N_of_Lines 
Lines_P_Driver = N_of_Lines/Desired_N_of_Lines 
Maint_Attr_rate = 0.057 
Maint_cost = Mainteinance_Staff*Avg_Wage_Maint 
Maint_Hiring_Rate = 0 
MAX_Municipal_CS = 33000000 
Municipality_Service_Contract = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 2.7e+007), (2010, 2.4e+007), (2011, 2.4e+007), (2012, 2.4e+007) 
Other_Expenses = GRAPH(TIME) 
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(2009, 1.7e+007), (2010, 1.8e+007), (2011, 1.8e+007), (2012, 1.9e+007) 
Other_Revenues = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 2.1e+006), (2010, 2.1e+006), (2011, 2.1e+006), (2012, 2.1e+006) 
Payed_Expenses = (Expenses/Payment_rate)-Leftover-Depreciation 
Payment_rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 1.57), (2010, 2.07), (2011, 1.97), (2012, 2.78) 
Percentage_of_Bus_on_Tot_Investment = IF Municipal_Contract_Service>28000000 then 
0.5 else 0.3 
Price_of_Gasoline = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 1.40), (2012, 1.90) 
Price_of_Methane = 1 
Reference_Net_Income = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, -6.9e+006), (2010, -8.1e+006), (2011, -7.7e+006), (2012, -1.3e+007) 
Revenues = If time<2012 then 
Regional_Service_Contracts+Revenues_from_Tickets+Other_Revenues+Municipality_Servic
e_Contract else 
Other_Revenues+Revenues_from_Tickets+Regional_Service_Contracts+Municipal_Contract
_Service+Municipality_Service_Contract*0 
Revenues_from_Tickets = (Ticket_Price_level*Tickets)+(Seasonal_Ticket*ST_avg_Price) 
ST_avg_Price = 576 
ST_Price_Benchmark = 550 
ST_Price_Driver = ST_avg_Price/ST_Price_Benchmark 
S_Ticket_trend = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 4506), (2010, 5489), (2011, 4415), (2012, 4277) 
Ticket_Price = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 1.20), (2010, 1.30), (2011, 1.30), (2012, 1.30) 
Ticket_Price_Benchmark = 1 
Ticket_Price_Driver = Ticket_Price_level/Ticket_Price_Benchmark 
Ticket_trend = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2009, 8.2e+006), (2010, 8e+006), (2011, 7.6e+006), (2012, 7.1e+006) 
Timeliness_P_driver = 1-Route_loss_perc 
Time_for_PT_to_impact = 0.5 
TIme_to_adjust_RSC = 1 
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Time_to_affect_Private_Transportation = 0.5 
Time_to_impact_on_frequence = 0.2 
Time_to_impact_on_quality = 0.5 
Time_to_perceive_chg_in_Quality = 0.5 
Time_to_perceive_fin_position = 0.5 
Total_nr_of_Buses = Buses_0_to_5_yr+Buses_5_to_10_yr+Bus_over_10_yr 
Total_Personnel_cost = Drivers_cost+Adm_cost+Maint_cost 
Total_Staff = Drivers+Administrative_Staff+Mainteinance_Staff 
Weighted_Effect_of_Customer_Sat_on_S_tickets = 
Effect_of_Customer_Satisfaction_on_Ticket_sales*2 
Weighted_Effect_of_Price_on_S_tickets = Effect_of_price_on_S_ticket/2 
Year = 1 
 
Palermo’s model structure with policy: 
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Appendix B (Buenos Aires’ model) 
Buenos Aires’ model equations with no policies:  
 
Desired_Ticket_Price(t) = Desired_Ticket_Price(t - dt) + (Chng_in_DTP) * dt 
INIT Desired_Ticket_Price = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chng_in_DTP = (Desired_Ticket_Price+(Desired_Ticket_Price)*Inflation_Perceived-
Desired_Ticket_Price)/4.8*Month^Time_rate_converter 
Funds_for_Subsidies(t) = Funds_for_Subsidies(t - dt) + (FFSIT - Subsidies_locking_price) * 
dt 
INIT Funds_for_Subsidies = 5226.45 
INFLOWS: 
FFSIT = Subsidies_locking_price 
OUTFLOWS: 
Subsidies_locking_price = Nr_of_Travels_per_month*GAP_in_Price 
Nr_of_Travels_per_month(t) = Nr_of_Travels_per_month(t - dt) + (Chng_in_Travels) * dt 
INIT Nr_of_Travels_per_month = 2819437 
INFLOWS: 
Chng_in_Travels = (((Total_Population*Fraction_of_Population_Travelling_with_line_60)-
Nr_of_Travels_per_month)/Month)*Service_Quality 
Private_companies__financial_resources(t) = Private_companies__financial_resources(t - dt) 
+ (Incomes - Costs - Profit - New_Investments) * dt 
INIT Private_companies__financial_resources = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Incomes = Subsidies_locking_price+Income_from_passengers 
OUTFLOWS: 
Costs = (Incomes)*0.95 
Profit = Private_companies__financial_resources*Investment_rate_choice_2  
New_Investments =  Private_companies__financial_resources*Investment_rate_choice_1  
Service_Quality(t) = Service_Quality(t - dt) + (Chng_in_Quality) * dt 
INIT Service_Quality = 1 
INFLOWS: 
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Chng_in_Quality = ((PD_assets+Effect_of_Travels__on_Quality)-
Service_Quality)/Time_for_assets_to_impact_on_quality 
Ticket_Price(t) = Ticket_Price(t - dt) + (Chng_in_Ticket_Price) * dt 
INIT Ticket_Price = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chng_in_Ticket_Price = 0.015 
Assets(t) = Assets(t - dt) + (New_Investments - Obsolecence) * dt 
INIT Assets = 222300000 
INFLOWS: 
New_Investments =  Private_companies__financial_resources*Investment_rate_choice_1  
OUTFLOWS: 
Obsolecence = Assets/Time_to_get_Obsolete 
Elder_Inhabitant(t) = Elder_Inhabitant(t - dt) + (Loosing_Fertility - Death_Rate) * dt 
INIT Elder_Inhabitant = 580118 
INFLOWS: 
Loosing_Fertility = Inhabitants_fertile/Time_to_Loose__Woman_Fertility 
OUTFLOWS: 
Death_Rate = Elder_Inhabitant/Time_to_die 
Inhabitants_Fertile(t) = Inhabitants_Fertile(t - dt) + (maturation + Migration - 
Loosing_Fertility) * dt 
INIT Inhabitants_Fertile = 320839 
INFLOWS: 
maturation = Young_Inhabitants/time_to_mature 
Migration = 1500 
OUTFLOWS: 
Loosing_Fertility = Inhabitants_fertile/Time_to_Loose__Woman_Fertility 
Young_Inhabitants(t) = Young_Inhabitants(t - dt) + (Birth_rate - maturation) * dt 
INIT Young_Inhabitants = 295140 
INFLOWS: 
Birth_rate = (Total_fertility_rate_Arg/Time_to_Loose__Woman_Fertility)*Fertile_womans 
OUTFLOWS: 
maturation = Young_Inhabitants/time_to_mature 
Desired_level_of_assets_IN = 222300000 
132 
 
Effect_of_Travels__on_Quality = GRAPH(Nr_of_Travels_per_month) 
(0.00, 0.273), (560000, 0.213), (1.1e+006, 0.116), (1.7e+006, 0.0787), (2.2e+006, 0.0487), 
(2.8e+006, 0.00), (3.4e+006, -0.0861), (3.9e+006, -0.116), (4.5e+006, -0.146), (5e+006, -
0.169), (5.6e+006, -0.213) 
Fertile_womans = Inhabitants_fertile*Woman_percentage 
Fraction_of_Population_Travelling_with_line_60 = 2.35 
GAP_in_Price = Desired_Ticket_Price-Ticket_Price 
Income_from_passengers = Ticket_Price*Nr_of_Travels_per_month 
Inflation = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 0.00), (12.9, 0.00), (24.8, 25.9), (36.8, 13.4), (48.7, 4.42), (60.6, 9.64), (72.5, 10.9), 
(84.5, 0.39), (96.4, 8.46), (108, 6.27), (120, 10.5), (132, 9.80), (144, 10.0), (156, 10.6) 
Inflation_Perceived = DELAYN(Inflation/100,24,2,Inflation) 
Investment_rate_choice_1 = 0.05 
Investment_rate_choice_2 = 0.95 
Month = 1 
PD_assets =  Assets/Desired_level_of_assets_IN  
Public_Mode_adoption_rate = Nr_of_Travels_per_month/Total_Population 
Time_for_assets_to_impact_on_quality = 24 
Time_rate_converter = 12 
Time_to_Die = 150.12 
Time_to_get_Obsolete = 180 
Time_to_Loose__Woman_Fertility = 252 
time_to_mature = 168 
Total_fertility_rate_Arg = 2.25 
Total_Population = Young_Inhabitants+Inhabitants_Fertile+Elder_Inhabitant 
Woman_percentage = 0.5211 
 
Buenos Aires’ model structure with no policies 
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Buenos Aires’ model equation with policies 
 
Desired_Ticket_Price(t) = Desired_Ticket_Price(t - dt) + (Chng_in_DTP) * dt 
INIT Desired_Ticket_Price = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chng_in_DTP = (Desired_Ticket_Price+(Desired_Ticket_Price)*Inflation_Perceived-
Desired_Ticket_Price)/4.8*Month^Time_rate_converter 
Funds_for_Subsidies(t) = Funds_for_Subsidies(t - dt) + (FFSIT - Subsidies_locking_price) * 
dt 
INIT Funds_for_Subsidies = 5226.45 
INFLOWS: 
FFSIT = Subsidies_locking_price 
OUTFLOWS: 
Subsidies_locking_price = MIN (Nr_of_Travels_per_month*GAP_in_Price; 20000000) 
Nr_of_Travels_per_month(t) = Nr_of_Travels_per_month(t - dt) + (Chng_in_Travels) * dt 
INIT Nr_of_Travels_per_month = 2819437 
INFLOWS: 
Chng_in_Travels = (((Total_Population*Fraction_of_Population_Travelling_with_line_60)-
Nr_of_Travels_per_month)/Month)*Service_Quality 
Ticket_Price(t) = Ticket_Price(t - dt) + (Chng_in_Ticket_Price) * dt 
INIT Ticket_Price = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chng_in_Ticket_Price = IF TIME <156 THEN 0.015 ELSE 0 
Assets(t) = Assets(t - dt) + (New_Investments - Obsolecence) * dt 
INIT Assets = 222300000 
INFLOWS: 
New_Investments = IF Private_companies__financial_resources =0 THEN 0 ELSE IF 
TIME< 156 THEN Private_companies__financial_resources*Investment_rate_choice_1 
ELSE IF PD_assets<1 THEN Assets/PD_assets/Time_to_make_investments ELSE 0 
OUTFLOWS: 
Obsolecence = Assets/Time_to_get_Obsolete 
Desired_Asset_level(t) = Desired_Asset_level(t - dt) + (Chg_in_DAL) * dt 
INIT Desired_Asset_level = 222300000 
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INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_DAL = (Desired_Asset_level*Quality_PD-
Desired_Asset_level)/Time_to_perceive__chg_in_quality 
Elder_Inhabitant(t) = Elder_Inhabitant(t - dt) + (Loosing_Fertility - Death_Rate) * dt 
INIT Elder_Inhabitant = 580118 
INFLOWS: 
Loosing_Fertility = Inhabitants_fertile/Time_to_Loose__Woman_Fertility 
OUTFLOWS: 
Death_Rate = Elder_Inhabitant/Time_to_die 
Inhabitants_Fertile(t) = Inhabitants_Fertile(t - dt) + (maturation + Migration - 
Loosing_Fertility) * dt 
INIT Inhabitants_Fertile = 320839 
INFLOWS: 
maturation = Young_Inhabitants/time_to_mature 
Migration = 1500 
OUTFLOWS: 
Loosing_Fertility = Inhabitants_fertile/Time_to_Loose__Woman_Fertility 
Private_companies__financial_resources(t) = Private_companies__financial_resources(t - dt) 
+ (Net_Income - Profit - New_Investments) * dt 
INIT Private_companies__financial_resources = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Net_Income = (Subsidies_locking_price+Income_from_passengers)-
(Subsidies_locking_price+Income_from_passengers)*0.95 
OUTFLOWS: 
Profit = IF Private_companies__financial_resources =0 THEN 0 ELSE IF TIME<156 THEN 
Private_companies__financial_resources*Investment_rate_choice_2 ELSE IF PD_assets<1 
THEN (Private_companies__financial_resources/Montlhy_converter)-New_Investments 
ELSE Private_companies__financial_resources/Montlhy_converter 
New_Investments = IF Private_companies__financial_resources =0 THEN 0 ELSE IF 
TIME< 156 THEN Private_companies__financial_resources*Investment_rate_choice_1 
ELSE IF PD_assets<1 THEN Assets/PD_assets/Time_to_make_investments ELSE 0 
Service_Quality(t) = Service_Quality(t - dt) + (Chng_in_Quality) * dt 
INIT Service_Quality = 1 
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INFLOWS: 
Chng_in_Quality = ((Effect_of_asset_on_Quality+Effect_of_Travels__on_Quality)-
Service_Quality)/Time_for_assets_to_impact_on_quality 
Young_Inhabitants(t) = Young_Inhabitants(t - dt) + (Birth_rate - maturation) * dt 
INIT Young_Inhabitants = 295140 
INFLOWS: 
Birth_rate = (Total_fertility_rate_Arg/Time_to_Loose__Woman_Fertility)*Fertile_womans 
OUTFLOWS: 
maturation = Young_Inhabitants/time_to_mature 
Desired_level_of_assets_IN = 222300000 
Effect_of_asset_on_Quality = GRAPH(PD_assets) 
(0.00, 0.509), (0.2, 0.509), (0.4, 0.547), (0.6, 0.644), (0.8, 0.787), (1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 1.21), 
(1.40, 1.30), (1.60, 1.35), (1.80, 1.38), (2.00, 1.40) 
Effect_of_Travels__on_Quality = GRAPH(Nr_of_Travels_per_month) 
(0.00, 0.161), (560000, 0.124), (1.1e+006, 0.109), (1.7e+006, 0.0787), (2.2e+006, 0.0487), 
(2.8e+006, 0.0112), (3.4e+006, -0.0337), (3.9e+006, -0.0712), (4.5e+006, -0.0861), (5e+006, 
-0.109), (5.6e+006, -0.116) 
Fertile_womans = Inhabitants_fertile*Woman_percentage 
Fraction_of_Population_Travelling_with_line_60 = 2.35 
GAP_in_Price = Desired_Ticket_Price-Ticket_Price 
Income_from_passengers = Ticket_Price*Nr_of_Travels_per_month 
Inflation = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 0.00), (12.9, 0.00), (24.8, 25.9), (36.8, 13.4), (48.7, 4.42), (60.6, 9.64), (72.5, 10.9), 
(84.5, 0.39), (96.4, 8.46), (108, 6.27), (120, 10.5), (132, 9.80), (144, 10.0), (156, 10.6) 
Inflation_Perceived = DELAYN(Inflation/100,24,2,Inflation) 
Investment_rate_choice_1 = 0.05 
Investment_rate_choice_2 = 0.95 
Month = 1 
Montlhy_converter = 1 
PD_assets = IF TIME < 156 THEN Assets/Desired_level_of_assets_IN ELSE 
Assets/Desired_Asset_level 
Public_Mode_adoption_rate = Nr_of_Travels_per_month/Total_Population 
Quality_PD = Standard_Quality/(Service_Quality) 
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Standard_Quality = 1 
Time_for_assets_to_impact_on_quality = 24 
Time_rate_converter = 12 
Time_to_Die = 150.12 
Time_to_get_Obsolete = 180 
Time_to_Loose__Woman_Fertility = 252 
Time_to_make_investments = 36 
time_to_mature = 168 
Time_to_perceive__chg_in_quality = 1000 
Total_fertility_rate_Arg = 2.25 
Total_Population = Young_Inhabitants+Inhabitants_Fertile+Elder_Inhabitant 
Woman_percentage = 0.5211 
 
Buenos Aires’ model structure with policies: 
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